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Abstract
Thailand is currently one of the ten largest fishing nations in the world. In 1996, fish 
production reached 3.7 million t with 90% of the production coming from the 
marine fisheries sector and 10% from inland fisheries. Thai fishing operates in four 
fishing grounds namely, the Gulf of Thailand, the Andaman Sea, the South China 
Sea and the Bay of Bengal. However with the establishment of the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ) in 1977, Thailand lost over 300 000 km2 of traditional fishing 
grounds.  
Gross domestic product (GDP) of Thailand was estimated at 4 598 billion Baht (US$ 
181 billion at 1 US$ = 25.36 Baht) in 1996 with 87.8 billion Baht (US$3.46 billion) 
(1.9%) coming from the fish industry. In 1997, fishery product exports reached 
138 624 million Baht (US$4 million at 1 US$ = 31.18 Baht) or 69% (200 795 million 
Baht including fish) of the total agriculture exports and 7.3% (1 898 276 million Baht) 
of total exports. However, the rapid growth of manufacturing and service sectors 
has diminished the contribution of the fisheries sector to GDP in the recent years.  
Of the estimated 35.6 million labor force in Thailand in 1998, 43% were employed 
in the agricultural sector including fisheries. The 1995 Census of Marine Fishery 
showed that the total number of fishery households including fisheries employees’ 
households in the country was 109 635. No census was conducted for inland fisher-
ies. The fisheries sector also supports a substantial level of employment in industries 
like fish processing, cold storage, fishmeal, ice making, boat construction and the 
like. The labor force of these industries was estimated to be at 211 682 in 1995.
Fish is the primary source of animal protein for most of Thailand’s population, 
particularly in the coastal and near-coastal provinces. The average per capita fish 
consumption is 24 kg annually. 
Marine capture fisheries can be broadly divided into commercial and small scale 
sub-sectors. Commercial vessels are those vessels over 10 m in length or 5 GT, that 
use modern fishing gear and have the capacity to fish offshore for several days.  
Small scale vessels are usually less than 10 m in length and either employ outboard- 
or inboard-engines, or are non-motorized and operate in near shore areas. From 578 WorldFish Center 579
1985 to 1995, the number of small scale fishing boats  increased by 7.5%, while the 
commercial boats increased by 11%. One reason for the change has been the cre-
ation of a boat-tenure system within the commercial fishing sector, resulting in a 
decrease in the number of boats per household.
The major fishing gear used by the small scale fishers are gillnets, small push nets, 
lift nets or other modern small scale gear, set traps, bagnets and other stationary 
gear in estuaries or protected inshore waters. In the fishing household of Songhkla 
Province, Southern Thailand, shrimp gillnets, cuttlefish trammel nets, Indo-Pacific 
mackerel gillnets, other gillnets and Acetes trawl nets are the major fishing gear.  
The fishers direct their effort towards high value species like shrimp, cuttlefish, 
pomfret fish and crabs, but they also obtain by-catch low value fish species. The 
most important determinant of profit for small scale fisheries is the interaction 
between types of gear and fishing ground.
Commercial fishing vessels utilize otter trawls, pair trawls, beam trawls, push nets, 
purse seines and king mackerel gillnets as the major fishing gear. The analysis of 
investment, cost, revenue and return on demersal and pelagic fishing operations 
shows that (a) returns differ markedly among size of fishing boats and types of fish-
ing gear; (b) ability to generate profit is greater in large  fishing boats than small  
due to their higher ability to adjust to both economic (investment) and biological 
(fishing ground) changes; and (c) among  the trawlers, medium and large boats 
can best adapt to maintain continuous profit, while for push nets, all size of boats 
show declining net profit. In pelagic fishing operations, purse seiners have been 
developed to make high profits and yield a higher return than trawlers and gillnet 
fishing operations.  
The Schaefer Model was applied to estimate the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
and maximum economic yield (MEY) for demersal fish and trash fish in the Gulf of 
Thailand. Results indicated that the present catch and the corresponding effort of  
demersal fishing in the Gulf of Thailand surpassed both MEY and MSY. In order to 
obtain the maximum net benefit in the long run, the present fishing effort of catching 
demersal fish must be reduced to about 50% of present levels. This would lead to 
the rehabilitation of marine resources and minimize the by-catch.
Socioeconomic Profile
Review of the Status of Marine Fisheries
Introduction
The production from fishery industries in Thailand 
has demonstrated remarkable growth over the last 
three decades. Thailand is now ranked among the 
top ten fishing nations of the world. Its fisheries 
production exceeded 2 million t for the first time 
in 1977, after which a decline followed. Production 
recovered to over 2 million t by 1983, and increased 
to 3.6 million t in 1995. Ninety per cent of total 
production comes from marine fisheries.
Before the 1977 proclamation of an Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ) by the neighbouring countries, 
the Thai fishing fleet operated in four major fishing 
grounds: the Gulf of Thailand, the Andaman Sea, 
the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Thai-
land lost over 300 000 km2 of traditional fishing 
grounds due to the establishment of EEZs. Among 
the marine fishing grounds that fall within Thai-
land’s EEZ, the Andaman Sea is an important one, 
with a total area of about 316 000 km2, and a coast-
line of 2 630 km. 
In 1995, the total marine catch was 2.8 million t, 
(Table 1) valued at 45 183 million Baht (US$1 737 
807)1. Compared with 1990 figures, it had increased 
42% in volume but 2.2 times in value. Of the total 
marine catch, about 70% is caught in Thai waters 
and the rest  from other countries’ zones. 
1 1US$ = Baht 26 at 1995 exchange rate.578 WorldFish Center 579
Historical Development of Marine Fisheries
Historically, Thai marine fisheries  were small scale 
fisheries along the coast of the Gulf of Thailand and 
Andaman Sea. The most popular fishing gear was 
fixed gear such as trap and set bag, which operated 
in  river  mouths  and  along  the  coast  at  a  depth 
of not more than 20 m. Most catches landed were 
pelagic species. In 1925, the Chinese purse seine 
from China was introduced, and was used experi-
mentally at a depth of less than 50 m. After the end 
of the 2nd World war (1951), the drift gillnet was 
introduced, which was effective in catching pelagic 
species and was widely accepted among Thai fish-
ers. In 1960, there was a major development with 
the introduction of the otter trawl. This gear drew 
attention towards demersal species, and away from 
labor-intensive fishing to commercial fisheries with 
heavy  investments  in  modern  technology.  There 
was a rapid increase in trawlers both in size and 
efficiency. Hence, over the decades two different 
fisheries - pelagic and demersal - have emerged in 
the Thai fishing industry.




Marine Inland Coastal aquaculture Freshwater culture
1 000 tons % 1 000 tons % 1 000 tons % 1 000 tons % 1 000 tons %
1977 2 189.9 100.0 2 064.4 94.3 89.2 4.1 3.2 0.1 33.1 1.5
1978 2 099.3 100.0 1 947.7 92.8 102.1 4.9 10.1 0.5 39.4 1.9
1979 1 946.3 100.0 1 802.3 92.6 103.7 5.3 10.9 0.6 29.4 1.5
1980 1 792.9 100.0 1 587.9 88.6 110.4 6.2 60.1 3.4 34.5 1.9
1981 1 989.0 100.0 1 756.9 88.3 116.5 5.9 67.5 3.4 48.1 2.4
1982 2 120.1 100.0 1 949.7 92.0 87.7 4.1 36.9 1.7 45.8 2.2
1983 2 255.4 100.0 2 055.2 91.1 108.4 4.8 44.8 2.0 47.0 2.1
1984 2 134.8 100.0 1 911.5 89.5 111.4 5.2 61.5 2.9 50.4 2.4
1985 2 225.2 100.0 1 997.2 89.8 92.2 4.1 60.6 2.7 75.2 3.4
1986 2 536.3 100.0 2 309.5 91.1 98.4 3.9 39.1 1.5 89.3 3.5
1987 2 779.1 100.0 2 540.0 91.4 87.4 3.1 61.9 2.2 89.8 3.2
1988 2 629.7 100.0 2 337.2 88.9 81.5 3.1 108.9 4.1 102.1 3.9
1989 2 740.0 100.0 2 370.5 86.5 109.1 4.0 168.7 6.2 91.7 3.3
1990 2 786.4 100.0 2 362.2 84.8 127.2 4.6 193.2 6.9 103.8 3.7
1991 2 967.7 100.0 2 478.6 83.5 136.0 4.6 230.4 7.8 122.7 4.1
1992 3 239.8 100.0 2 736.4 84.5 132.0 4.1 229.3 7.1 142.1 4.4
1993 3 385.1 100.0 2 752.5 81.3 175.4 5.2 295.6 8.7 161.6 4.8
1994 3 523.2 100.0 2 804.4 79.6 202.6 5.8 345.8 9.8 170.4 4.8
1995 3 572.6 100.0 2 827.4 79.1 191.7 5.4 357.5 10.0 196.0 5.5
1996* 3 489.7 100.0 2 769.0 79.3 203.5 5.8 311.3 8.9 205.9 5.9
1997** 3 412.2 100.0 2 666.3 78.1 212.5 6.2 317.2 9.3 216.2 6.3
1998** 3 665.4 100.0 2 867.5 78.2 235.4 6.4 333.2 9.1 229.2 6.3
Source: Fisheries Economics Division, Department of Fisheries 1972 – 97.
Note: * Preliminary data
          ** Estimated data580 WorldFish Center 581
Development of Pelagic Fisheries
 
The development of pelagic fisheries up to the present 
can be divided into three phases. The final phase is 
complex  and  involves  management  necessary  to 
control its development.  
Phase 1 (1925 - 64). The most important fishing 
gear for pelagic species was fixed gear such as traps, 
while Thai purse seine, Chinese purse seine and 
mackerel  gillnet  became  widely  used  (Table  2). 
Eighty  percent  of  pelagic  species  landed  were 
mackerel.  
Phase 2 (1965 - 73) was the period of growth for 
pelagic  fisheries.  Thai  purse  seine  and  mackerel 
encircling gillnet vessels increased, both in number 
and size, and these replaced trap fishing. Produc-
tion from pelagic fisheries doubled that of Phase 1, 
and led to the expansion of the fish processing in-
dustry  such  as  canning.  The  management  tech-
niques of pelagic fisheries changed from searching 
for more fishing grounds to the study of population 
dynamics and stock assessment to be used  subse-
quently. 
Phase 3 (1974 - present) witnessed the highest level 
of pelagic fisheries development. New fishing gear, 
such as luring purse seine, was introduced during 
this  phase.  This  replaced  Thai  purse  seine  and 
mackerel encircling gillnet used during Phase 2. 
The number of luring purse seiners increased dra-
matically both in terms of size and quantity from 
1 in 1972 to 730 vessels in 1981. During 1974 to 
1977  catching  methods  were  developed  from 
searching for fish schools to aggregation methods 
using electrical equipment. Since 1977, there has 
been another major development with the intro-
duction of  sonar and power block. Concurrently, 
medium size trawlers, which were affected by fuel 
price increases, were converted to purse seiners, 
and fishing vessels became larger in size and capa-
ble of offshore fishing.  
The development of pelagic fisheries was clearly 
demonstrated by a four-fold increase in produc-
tion2 from 223 900 t in 1974 to 953 900 t in 1994 
(Table 2). Almost all pelagic fish resources in the 
Gulf of Thailand are fully exploited and there is 
some sign of stock depletion.  
Table 2. Number of selected types of gear (fishing unit) registered and marine fish caught in Thailand, 1957 – 98.
Year

















1957 1 287 324 N/A N/A N/A N/A 133.7 37.2 170.9
1958 1 344 392 N/A N/A N/A N/A 94.9 50.1 145.0
1959 1 470 379 N/A N/A N/A N/A 89.4 58.4 147.8
1960 1 409 323 48 N/A 99 N/A 82.8 63.7 146.5
1961 918 251 233 N/A 201 N/A 110.2 123.1 233.3
1962 792 228 386 N/A 976 N/A 118.3 151.4 269.7
1963 662 212 537 N/A 2 026 N/A 95.9 227.5 323.4
1964 602 144 890 N/A 2 360 N/A 128.1 371.0 499.1
1965 697 226 634 N/A 2 393 N/A 148.3 392.7 541.0
1966 663 228 409 N/A 2 695 N/A 202.5 445.0 647.5
1967 447 278 417 N/A 3 077 N/A 601.0 161.1 762.1
1968 457 361 329 N/A 3 182 N/A 792.5 211.5 1 004.0
2 including catch from outside Thai waters.580 WorldFish Center 581
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1969 374 314 224 N/A 3 185 N/A 948.5 231.0 1 179.5
1970 371 716 260 235 3 082 354 998.0 337.6 1 335.6
1971 313 475 244 151 3 608 610 1 265.9 204.2 1 470.1
1972 236 506 254 138 4 486 1 327 1 428.7 119.4 1 548.1
1973 189 680 228 231 5 837 1 628 1 338.2 199.8 1 538.0
1974 229 657 188 148 5 271 1 213 1 127.7 223.9 1 351.6
1975 262 625 187 177 4 962 1 075 1 130.7 263.9 1 394.6
1976 222 726 226 157 5 204 844 1 197.5 345.3 1 542.8
1977 242 706 314 244 6 288 1 177 1 552.1 515.5 2 067.6
1978 250 843 359 151 6 453 1 426 1 515.9 441.9 1 957.8
1979 258 681 256 227 8 747 1 923 1 386.1 416.2 1 802.3
1980 225 781 307 287 10 421 2 262 1 259.7 328.2 1 587.9
1981 277 833 258 327 7 525 1 216 1 368.5 388.4 1 756.9
1982 233 840 238 281 11 475 1 899 1 554.2 395.5 1 949.7
1983 225 846 144 264 9 390 1 326 1 542.6 512.6 2 055.2
1984 254 961 245 265 9 131 960 1 338.9 572.6 1 911.5
1985 234 951 227 269 8 325 759 1 409.1 588.1 1 997.2
1986 258 996 203 329 7 407 664 1 739.4 570.1 2 309.5
1987 253 1 174 223 365 7,343 624 1 910.4 629.6 2 540.0
1988 231 1 456 146 461 6,950 531 1 699.2 638.0 2 337.2
1989 208 1 443 114 282 13 113 1 907 1 666.9 703.6 2 370.5
1990 188 1 629 101 299 12 905 1 879 1 643.0 719.2 2 362.2
1991 188 1 614 88 338 10 298 1 047 1 752.5 726.1 2 478.6
1992 204 1 452 72 362 9 465 818 1 895.2 841.2 2 736.4
1993 190 1 509 94 271 9 086 808 1 896.9 855.6 2 752.5
1994 190 1 511 99 280 8 346 651 1 850.5 953.9 2 804.4
1995 139 1 397 82 330 7 995 634 1 858.7 968.7 2 827.4
Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 1972 – 97.
Note:  1/ Chinese purse seine, Thai purse seine, Luring purse seine and Anchovy purse seine.
           2/ Otter trawl, Pair trawl and Beam trawl.
           3/ Demersal fish, Trash fish, Cephalopod, Crab, Shrimp, Mollusc and others.
           N/A = Not available.
Table 2. Number of selected types of gear (fishing unit) registered and marine fish caught in Thailand, 1957 – 98. (continued)582 WorldFish Center 583
Development of Demersal Fisheries
Demersal fisheries were not popular prior to 1960.   
There was an unsuccessful introduction of trawl 
by private companies in 1952. This type of fishing 
requires  experienced  and  skilled  crews  and  the 
demersal species caught had yet to find a market.   
Nevertheless, some fishers were successful in con-
verting the trawl into beam trawl by using smaller-
size vessels and harvesting shrimp along the coast.   
In 1960, the Government of the Republic of Ger-
many rendered technical assistance in marine fish-
eries  development  by  surveying  fishing  grounds 
and providing suitable fishing gear for harvesting 
marine  resources.  The  otter  trawl  was  the  most 
effective gear and became widely deployed. The 
number of fishing vessels increased rapidly from 
99 in 1960 to 13113 in 1990, and decreased to 
7 995 in 1995.  During this  time, Thai trawl fisher-
ies  went  through  both  expansion  and  crisis,  in 
three distinct phases.
Phase 1 (1960 - 73) had the same  rapid develop-
ment of demersal fisheries as Phase 2 of pelagic 
fisheries. This was the period of great expansion 
of trawl such as pair trawl and beam trawl, and 
especially otter trawling. The number of trawlers 
increased 59 - fold from 99 in 1960 to 5 837 in 
1973. Since demersal resources were abundant and 
newly  discovered,  and  the  financial  return  from 
trawling  higher than from other fishing gear at that 
time, investment in trawlers became attractive. In-
vestment in trawling increased both in terms of the 
number and size of fishing boats, which ventured 
into international waters for the first time.  
Concurrently  in  1967  -  71,  the  Department  of 
Fisheries discovered fishing grounds in the Bay of 
Bengal, the best grounds for trawling, and large   
fishing boat construction began. The increase in 
fishing boats resulted in an increment in demer-
sal catch of 2.1 - fold, from 63 700 t in 1960 to 
1 338 200 t in 1973 (Table 2). However, crises 
immediately followed. Demersal fisheries resources 
especially in the Gulf of Thailand, began to suffer 
from  over-exploitation.  Sustainable  yield  of  this 
fishery is about 768 000 t with a fishing effort of 
8  x  106  hours  (Boonyubol  and  Pramokchutima, 
1984). At the same time, fuel prices increased by 
four times in 1973 and 1974. The rise in fuel price 
also  had  implications  on  the  world  economy, 
causing a drop in demand by importers of Thai 
fisheries  products,  and  eventually  affecting  the 
domestic price.
Phase 2 (1974 - 81). The number of trawlers and 
demersal catches landed in 1974 dropped by 34% 
and 16% respectively compared with 1973. An-
other fuel price increase during 1979 - 80 forced 
many  fishers  to  operate  the  more  fuel-efficient 
purse  seine.  Landings  of  pelagic  species  conse-
quently showed an increase against the decline of 
demersal species (Table 2). The final crisis affecting 
trawl  fisheries,  especially  the  medium  and  large 
size trawlers, came with the declaration of EEZs.   
Neighbouring countries, particularly the archipe-
lagic ones benefited from this declaration. Howe-
ver, Thailand as a shelf-locked state, surrounded by 
EEZs of other nations, cannot expand its economic 
zone. Coupled with little shelf area, the division of 
territorial waters based on the equidistance princi-
ple generated a great loss to Thai fisheries resoures. 
Other countries claimed parts of the high seas that 
were  formerly  utilized  by  the  Thai  fishers,  thus 
decreasing fishing grounds by about 300 000 km2. 
The  number  of  trawlers  in  the  Gulf  increased, 
thereby depleting the resources. These additional 
fishing  vessels  raised  the  fishing  effort  and  the 
effort levels of individual trawlers also increased.   
Fishing  boats  that  continued  to  fish  outside  the 
Gulf needed additional investment for more effec-
tive engines and navigational aids, such as radar, 
to avoid arrest.   
This situation led to a recommendation to reduce 
the number of trawlers and initiate control mea-
sures in 1981. In the final period of this phase, 
negotiations were started on joint ventures in fish-
eries with other nations, with the main objective 
to seek sectional new fishing grounds and to settle 
the problems of intrusion of Thai vessels. A Joint 
Venture Agreement between Thailand and Bangla-
desh was signed in 1980. This was the first time 
that Thai fishing vessels could legally operate in 
international waters after the proclamation of the 
EEZs of the neighbouring countries.
Phase  3  (1981  -  present).  Various  crises  brought 
about the decline of trawlers during the early period 
of fuel price adjustment. However after the adjust-
ment, growth in fishing effort and fishing gear with 
small mesh size cod-ends, along with inshore fish-
ing increased the catch of trash fish and thus fishers’ 
incomes. This practice created problems with the 
artisanal fishers. Catching the fingerlings as trash 
fish leads to a decline in the population of demersal 582 WorldFish Center 583
fish. At the same time, medium and large trawlers 
were not profitable since improvement in efficiency 
was  needed,  by  increasing  engine  capacity  and 
introducing navigational aids such as radar to oper-
ate along the boundary or sometimes in the neigh-
bouring waters. The problems of arrests  increased.   
Nonetheless, the number of trawlers reached 9 393 
in 1983 due to newly constructed fishing vessels 
(Table 2). The Department of Fisheries issued mea-
sures  to  control  the  construction  of  new  trawl 
vessels, including issuance of fishing licenses for 
trawl fishing. However, these measures were not 
strictly enforced due to lack of coordination among 
concerned agencies. The fishers had more interest 
in the negotiation of joint ventures, charter vessels 
and hire purchase agreements with Australia, Indo-
nesia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and India. Fish, thus 
caught are brought back to Thailand, resulting in 
a slight increment in marine fishery production at 
the present time. 
 
Contribution  of  the  Fisheries  Sector  to 
Economic Growth and Welfare
Contribution of Fisheries Sector to Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP)
Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) was esti-
mated at 4 598 billion Baht in 1996, of which the 
fishing industry contributed 87.8 billion Baht or 
1.9% of GDP, a decline from the average of 3% of 
GDP during the period 1994 to 1996. The main 
reasons for the diminished contribution to GDP by 
the fisheries sector in recent years were the rapid 
growth of manufacturing and service sectors and 
the comparatively slow growth of the fisheries sec-
tor.  These factors were partially offset by increases 
in real fish prices. In constant (1983) price terms, 
the aggregate value of fish production  peaked in 
1978 at 21 000 million Baht. Furthermore, although 
the fisheries sector makes a relatively small contri-
bution to Thailand’s GDP, it makes an important 
contribution to export earnings and employment, 
and provides the Thai people with the principal 
source of animal protein in their diet (Table 3).
Contribution of Fishing Industry to Income and 
Employment
The  labor  force  of  Thailand  was  estimated  at 
35.6 million in 1998, of which some 15.4 million 
(43%)  were  employed  in  the  agricultural  sector 
(including fisheries).
  
The 1995 Census of Marine Fishery revealed that 
the total number of fishery and fishery employees’ 
households  in  the  country  was  109  635.  They 
are comprised of 50 312 households exclusively 
engaged  in  capture  fishery;  27  388  households 
engaged in coastal aquaculture; 3 001 engaged in 
both marine capture fishery and coastal aquacul-
ture; and 28 934 households of fishery employees. 
The population engaged in marine fisheries was 
535 210 persons (Table 4).
The  inland  fisheries  census  was  not  conducted,   
however most rice-growing farmers know how to 
catch fish, i.e. they are part-time fishers. Millions of 
farmers  routinely  catch  freshwater  fish  for  their 
own consumption.
A survey on freshwater fish-farm production since 
1974  was  conducted,  but  unfortunately  not  all 
aquaculturists and employees were recorded. The 
survey showed that the number of freshwater fish 
farms continuously increased from 61 980 farms 
in 1990 to 161 504 farms in 1994. This indicates 
that  at  least  300  000  persons  were  involved  in 
freshwater aquaculture in 1994.
Additionally, the fisheries sector supports substan-
tial employment in industries such as  fish process-
ing, cold storage, fish meal, ice making, boat con-
struction, etc. The labor force of these industries 
was estimated at 211 682 in 1995.
Contribution of Fisheries Sector to Foreign Ex-
change Earning
The  contribution  to  Thailand’s  export  earnings 
by the fishing and fish processing industries has 
increased steadily in recent years (Table 5). The 
positive  trade  balance  in  fish  and  fish  products 
increased from 11 584 million Baht to 111 185 
million Baht (US$3 566 million at 1 US$ = 31.18 
Baht in 1997) between 1983 and 1997. Although 
the industry relies on imported inputs such as die-
sel fuel and netting, material earnings remain sub-
stantial,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  level  of 
employment in the industry. Fishery product ex-
ports in 1997 totaled 138 624 million Baht (US$4 
446 million), equivalent to 69% of total agriculture 
exports (200 795 Baht million including fish) and 
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Contribution of Fishery Sector to Domestic Nutrition
The contribution of fish and other food to the Thai 
diet during 1995 is reported in Table 6a. Fish is the 
primary source of animal protein for most of Thai-
land’s population, particularly in the coastal and 
                                     Table 4. Fisheries sector employment in Thailand, 1995.
Type of employment No. of Fishers, Fish farmers and Employees
Marine capture1 157 377
Coastal aquaculture2 45 898
Inland culture3 404 344
Related fisheries industry4 220 370
TOTAL 827 989
                                     Sources: 1, 2 1995 Marine Fishery Census.
                                                     3 No. of farmer = (no. of fishfarm x 2 persons).
                                                     4 Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.
Table 5. Trade balance in the fisheries sector of Thailand, 1983 - 97.
Year
Import Export Trade Balance
Q (tons) V (M. Baht) Q (tons) V (M. Baht) Q (tons) V (M. Baht)
1983 58 942 1 093 344 899 12 677 285 957 11 584
1984 119 064 2 119 411 722 15 081 292 658 12 962
1985 152 707 3 857 466 219 18 528 313 512 14 670
1986 268 089 7 590 602 486 26 829 334 397 19 239
1987 227 327 7 017 663 650 32 654 436 323 25 637
1988 347 666 14 713 798 572 44 437 450 906 29 724
1989 455 755 19 067 875 293 53 705 419 538 34 638
1990 507 737 20 653 904 973 61 070 397 236 40 418
1991 724 668 27 353 1 087 395 78 463 362 727 51 110
1992 714 012 24 569 1 106 141 82 469 392 129 57 901
1993 760 919 21 629 1 115 078 91 018 354 159 69 389
1994 893 588 21 329 1 214 946 110 285 321 358 88 956
1995 872 818 21 924 1 192 560 116 578 319 742 94 654
1996 797 389 22 425 1 146 949 110 781 349 560 88 356
1997 710 115 27 439 1 181 255 138 624 471 140 111 185
Sources: Custom Department, Ministry of Finance.
near-coastal  provinces.  Over  the  period  1978  to 
1997, the per capita consumption of fish in Thai-
land averaged 24 kg annually and fluctuated be-
tween highs of about 32.8 - 33.8 kg in 1994 and 
1995 and lows of about 18.8 -18.9 kg in 1987 - 88 
(Table 6b).       586 WorldFish Center 587
Table 6a. Per capita food intake in Thailand, 1995.
Items
Whole Country Urban Area Rural Area
Grams/day % Grams/day % Grams/day %
Cereals, Roots and Tubers 305.7 41.4 281.4 37.4 312.3 42.4
Sugar and Honey 13.7 1.9 14.6 1.9 13.4 1.8
Pulses, Nuts and Oilseeds 17.1 2.3 19.7 2.6 16.3 2.2
Vegetables 113.2 15.3 101.4 13.5 116.7 15.9
Fruit 76.8 10.4 93.9 12.5 72.0 9.8
Oils and Fats 14.0 1.9 12.3 1.6 14.4 2.0
Meats 71.4 9.7 83.4 11.1 68.1 9.3
Fish 46.6 6.3 47.3 6.3 46.5 6.3
Eggs 21.4 2.9 17.2 2.3 22.5 3.1
Milk 29.3 4.0 44.6 5.9 25.1 3.4
Others 29.9 4.0 35.8 4.8 28.4 3.9



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (1) - (2) + (3) - (4) (6) (7) = (5) / (6)
1978 2 099 887 114 237 1 088.7 45.2 24.1
1979 1 946 808 364 250 1 251.9 46.1 27.1
1980 1 792 773 140 227 932.3 47.0 19.8
1981 1 989 797 152 269 1 076.1 47.6 22.6
1982 2 121 813 128 338 1 098.4 48.4 22.7
1983 2 255 803 116 405 1 162.4 49.5 23.5
1984 2 135 758 166 547 996.4 50.5 19.7
1985 2 225 776 207 639 1 015.8 51.5 19.7
1986 2 536 976 362 847 1 074.2 52.5 20.4
1987 2 779 1 106 220 881 1 012.7 53.5 18.9
1988 2 630 956 343 993 1 023.8 54.6 18.8
1989 2 740 980 436 1 095 1 100.7 55.2 19.9
1990 2 786 978 475 1 174 1 108.7 56.1 19.8
1991 2 958 982 664 1 359 1 281.0 56.9 22.5
Table 6b. Apparent consumption of fish in Thailand, 1970 - 97.586 WorldFish Center 587



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (1) - (2) + (3) - (4) (6) (7) = (5) / (6)
1992 3 240 1 001 637 1 393 1 482.6 57.6 25.7
1993 3 385 1 027 788 1 438 1 708.5 58.5 29.2
1994 3 523 930 883 1 535 1 940.5 59.1 32.8
1995 3 573 916 864 1 510 2 010.7 59.5 33.8
1996 3 500 900 737 1 438 1 899.5 60.1 31.6
1997* 3 460 900 728 1 645 1 642.7 60.8 27.0
Average 2 684 903 426 911 1 295.4 53.5 24.0
Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 1972 - 97.
Note: * Preliminary data.
Socioeconomic Analysis of the Small Scale 
Fishery Sector
Assessment of Status of Fishing Households and 
Communities 
The coastline of Thailand is 2 614 km in length. 
Twenty-three provinces are situated along the coast. 
The Department of Fisheries has divided the prov-
inces into five coastal fishing regions. Regions 1 -  4 
cover the Gulf of Thailand and the fishing gear of 
these regions is given in Figure 1. Region 5 covers 
the coastal areas of the Andaman Sea.
According to a Preliminary Report on Marine Fishery 
Census in 1995 (National Statistics Office (NSO), 
1992a; National Statistics Office (NSO), 1992b), 
there are 80 701 marine fishing households that 
can be classified into three types. Households that 
engage exclusively in fisheries account for 62.3%; 
those in coastal aquaculture account for 35%; and 
those  engaged  in  both  fisheries  and  aquaculture 
account for 3.7%. In 1995, about 53 112 fishing 
households were engaged in marine fisheries, of 
which 85.5% can be classified as small scale fishing 
households2 and 15.5% can be classified as commercial-
scale fishing households (Table 7a).
A structural change in Thailand’s fisheries has taken 
place during the last 10 years. From 1985 - 90, the 
number  of  fishing  households  and  fishing  boats 
decreased by 6.7% and 2.3% respectively (Tables 
7a - b). Small scale fishing households and small 
scale fishing boats decreased by 5.9% and 0.6% 
respectively whereas commercial-scale fishing boats 
decreased by 9.8%. The decrease in the number 
of small scale fishing boats was largely due to the 
decrease  in  coastal  fishing  resources  on  the  one 
hand, and conflicts between small scale and the 
commercial-scale fishers on the other.
During 1990 - 95, the number of fishing house-
holds and fishing boats in Thailand increased by 
11.0% and 5.4% respectively (Tables 7a - b). The 
increase in fishing households has largely been in 
commercial fisheries. 
The increase in fishing boats has been in the small 
scale sector. Small scale fishing boats account for 
8.1% of the total increase while commercial boats 
have actually decreased in number by 3.7%. One 
reason  for  the  change  in  commercial  boats  has 
been the creation of a boat-tenure system within 
the commercial fishing sector, which resulted in a 
decrease of the number of boats per household.
Three  major  factors  have  led  to  the  increase  in 
small  scale  fishing  households  and  small  scale 
fishing boats during the last five years. First, the 
2 Small scale fishing households are defined as those which use non-powered boats or outboard-powered boats or inboard-powered boats with less than 
  5 gross ton (GT) engine is fishing operations.588 WorldFish Center 589
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15. Big block net
16. Winged sat bag
17. Net for Malaya lift net
18. Bamboo mud crab trap
19. Acetes trawl
20. Plotorus brush piles
21. Bamboo cylinder trap
22. Mysis purae seine
23. Beach seine
24. Squid hook line
1. Swimming crab set gillnet
2. Shrimp gillnet
3. Fish gillnet




8. Circular net crab trap
9. Crab lift net
10. Push net
11. Ark shell rake
12. Small winged set bag























THAILAND588 WorldFish Center 589
population  in  coastal  fishing  communities  has 
increased. Second, coastal fishery resources have 
partly recovered because of artificial reefs. The reefs 
have become additional fishing areas and have also 
been able to inhibit coastal trawl fishing. Third, 
fishing  communities  are  enthusiastic  in  locating 
more fishing areas by themselves.
Socioeconomic Conditions of Small Scale Fishing 
Communities
Most small scale fishing communities are located 
in  the  coastal  areas  of  Thailand.  In  1992,  there 
were 2 562 fishing communities in Thailand (Na-
tional Statistics Office (NSO) and Department of 
Fisheries (DOF), 1992). Of these, 76% are situated 
on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand and 24% are on 
the Andaman Sea coast. Of the small scale fishing 
households  in  the  coastal  fishing  communities 
61.7% are Buddhists and 38.3% are Muslims (Pan-
ayotou 1985).
Structure of the Small Scale Fishing Households
According to the 1990 survey, the average size of 
small scale fishing households is 5.5 persons. Fishing 
households in Region 4 are the largest with 7 per-
Table 7a. Change in fishing households in Thailand, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
Year
Small scale Commercial-scale Total
Number % % of change Number %  % of change Nuumber % % of change
19851/ 41 592 81.2 9 653 18.8 51 245 100.0
19902/ 39 127 81.8 -5.93 8 709 18.2 -9.78 47 836 100.0 -6.65
19953/ 44 867 84.5 14.70 8 245 15.5 -5.33 53 112 100.0 11.00
Table 7b. No. of fishing boats classified by type of fishing operations, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
Year
Small scale Commercial-scale Total
Number % % of change Number % % of change Number % % of change
19851/ 40 095 86.2 – 12 855 13.8 – 52 950 100.0 –
19902/ 39 870 84.9 -0.56 11 887 15.1 -7.53 51 757 100.0 -2.25
19953/ 43 092 86.7 8.10 11 446 13.3 -3.71 54 538 100.0 5.40
Source: 1/ National Statistics Office and Department of fisheries (1987)
             2/ National Statistics Office and Department of Fisheries (1992)
             3/ National Statistics Office (1996)
sons per household. In Regions 5, 2, 1 and 3, the 
average  size  are  5.5,  5.3,  5.1  and  5.1  persons 
per household, respectively. Custom and religion 
affect the size of fishing households. For instance, 
in Region 4 (consisting of Nakorn Sri Thammarat, 
Songkhla, Pattani and Narathiwas Provinces) and 
in  Region  5  (Ranong,  Phang-nga,  Phuket,  Krabi, 
Trang and Satun Provinces) where most of the fish-
ing households are Muslim, the average household 
size is larger (Adulavidhaya 1980).
Occupational Structure of Small Scale Fishing 
Households
Some members of the fishing households may earn 
additional  income  depending  on  the  location  of 
village  or  fishing  community.  Examples  include 
jobs  in  marine  animal  culture,  marine  animal 
processing, fishing boat crew, processing factories 
and  shrimp  culture.  Activities  in  agriculture  in-
clude  rice  growing,  horticulture,  crop  growing 
and  animal  raising.  Other  jobs  include  those  of 
technician, and small scale merchant. Reasons for 
supplementary  occupations  are:  (a)  low  income 
from fisheries; (b) instability in fisheries; (c) unem-
ployed labor in households, especially women; (d) 
off-season unemployment.590 WorldFish Center 591
Income Structure of Fishing Households
Income  of  small  scale  fishing  households  comes 
from  various  sources,  although  fishing  generates 
the main income. According to a 1992 income and 
expenditure survey (National Statistics Office (NSO), 
1992b), the annual national average income was 
58 776 Baht. Fisheries income accounts for 77.3% 
of the total. For small scale fishing households on 
the Andaman Sea coast and those in the Gulf of 
Thailand, fisheries income accounts for 75.2% and 
78.3% respectively of the total income (Table 8a). 
Therefore, the condition of coastal resources is a 
major factor that determines the income and living 
conditions of small scale fishing households.
Living Conditions of Small Scale Fishers
The living standard of small scale fishing households 
can be calculated using two approaches. The first is 
comparison of the per capita income. The second is 
estimation of Engel’s coefficient (ratio of the house-
hold’s food expenditure to the total expenditure). A 
ratio greater than 50% indicates that food expendi-
ture is a major household expense and that such 
households have a low standard of living. This is 
based on the principle that household income will 
be spent on food as a priority and that any remaining 
surplus will be spent for other purposes.
In  1990,  the  annual  national  average  per  capita 
income of small scale fishers was 10 687 Baht. Av-
erage per capita income on the Andaman Sea coast 
was 9 836 Baht and 11 953 Baht for the Gulf of 
Thailand (National Statistics Office (NSO) and De-
partment of Fisheries (DOF), 1992). Annual na-
tional per capita income of all sectors was 16 463 
Baht and 14 054 Baht in southern Thailand (Na-
tional  Statistics  Office  (NSO),  1992a).  The  per 
capita income of small scale fishers on the Anda-
man Sea coast was not only less than the national 
and the southern per capita income but also less 
than that of small scale fishers nationwide. Small 
scale fishers in the Gulf of Thailand have the lowest 
per capita income compared to small scale fishers 
nationwide and people living in the southern region 
(Table 8a).
In 1990, Engel’s coefficients of the small scale fish-
ing households were 60.4 for the whole country, 
61.3 for the Andaman Sea coast and 59.1 for the 
Gulf  of  Thailand.  Comparing  these  figures  with 
the national coefficient of 39.2 and the southern
coefficient  of  42.4,  the  living  standard  of  small 
scale coastal fishers is lower than the national aver-
age and that of southern Thailand. The living stan-
dard of small scale coastal fishers on the Andaman 
Sea coast is not only lower than the national and 
the regional average in southern Thailand, but also 
lower than that of the nationwide average of small 
scale fishers (Table 8b). 
Occupational and Geographical Mobility 
The  open-access  theory  assumes  perfect  factor 
mobility in and out of fishing. Fishers, especially 
small  scale  fishers,  are  occupationally  and  geo-
graphically  immobile  for  reasons  which  include: 
attachment to fishing as a way of life, gambling 
behavior,  socio-cultural  constraints,  sunk  capital 
costs, low education, ignorance of alternative op-
portunities, unresponsiveness to economic incen-
tives, etc.
Panayotou and Panayotou (1986) in surveys taken 
five years apart in a number of villages in Chumporn 
(Gulf of Thailand) and Phang Nga (Andaman coast), 
and employing different methods of analysis, showed 
that fishers are responsive to economic incentives 
and do move between occupations and locations;   
less so between locations. Capital tends to be less 
mobile than labor, at least in the short run. Fishers 
do not admit to having an emotional attachment to 
fishing, but they like the freedom and indepen-
dence of being one’s own boss. For this reason they 
reject employment in factories, but  are prepared to 
take up crop or fish farming if  given land or other 
assistance.  
Fishers admit attachment to their own areas and 
they distrust unknown, far-away places. Given a 
choice, they prefer to move to rural areas than to 
the big city. This is true especially of fishers who 
live in more isolated fishing communities, such as 
those of the Andaman Sea coast. Both religion and 
distance appear to constrain geographical mobility.   
Muslim fishers and their families travel less than 
Buddhist and, when they do, they visit neighbouring 
Muslim provinces.  
Mobility in and out of fishing is lower than mobil-
ity in and out of non-fishing occupations. Mobility 
of  labor  out  of  fishing  is  greater  than  mobility 
into fishing. Fishing is losing ground as an occupa-
tion while the population of fishing communities 
stabilizes as a result of (a) the drying-up of the per-
manent in-migration of the sixties and the seven-
ties, and (b) the reduction in population growth. 590 WorldFish Center 591








Small scale Fishing Households
Total Average Gulf of Thailand  Andaman Sea Coast
(Baht·yr-1) % (Baht·yr-1) % (Baht·yr-1) %
Total Income 67 500 61 836 58 776 100.0 63 351 100.0 54 098 100.0
1. Cash Income 43 333 73.7 50 856 80.3 42 257 78.1
1.1 Fisheries Income:
      - Fishing Income
      - Fish Culture




















      - Salary and Wage
      - Farming Income
      - Small scale Business

























2. Non-cash Income: 12 443 21.2 12 495 19.7 11 841 21.9
2.1 Fishing Income 6 216 10.6 6 528 10.3 5 484 10.1
2.2 Goods and Services 1 764 3.0 1 401 2.2 2 227 4.1
2.3 Housing Rent 4 463 7.6 4 566 7.2 4 130 7.6
Family Size (persons) 4.1 4.4 5.5 5.3 5.5
Income per Capita (Baht·yr-1) 16 463 14 054 10 687 11 953 9 836
Source: National Statistics Office 1992b.
Table 8b. Annual expenditures of Thai household and small scale fishing household, 1990.
Items
All Household in Thailand1 Small scale Fishing Household2
Whole Country Southern Region Total Average Gulf of Thailand
Andaman 
Sea Coast
(Baht·yr-1) % (Baht·yr-1) % (Baht·yr-1) % (Baht·yr-1) % (Baht·yr-1) %
Total expenditure 65 244 100.0 61 920 100.0 49 474 100.0 54 347 100.0 44 798 100.0
- Food and Drink 25 584 39.2 26 268 42.4 29 885 60.4 33 307 61.3 26 489 59.1
- Clothing 3 816 5.8 3 768 6.1 1 695 3.4 1 637 3.0 1 761 3.9
- Housing rent 14 628 22.4 11 616 18.8 8 147 16.5 8 906 16.4 7 267 16.2
- Medical care 2 220 3.4 2 100 3.4 818 1.7 948 1.7 758 1.7
- Others 18 996 29.1 18 168 29.3 8 929 18.0 9 549 17.6 8 523 19.0
Engel’s coefficients 39.2 42.4 60.4 61.3 59.1
Source: 1   National Statistics Office 1992a.
             2  Small scale fishing households are defined as those which use non-powered boats or outboard-powered boats or inboard-powered  
                boats with less than 5 gross ton (GT) engine is fishing operations.592 WorldFish Center 593
Out-migration is temporary and usually in response 
to economic incentives, such as fishing activities 
elsewhere.  In-migration  is  more  permanent  and 
socially rather than economically induced.  
In  Chumporn Province (Gulf of Thailand), occu-
pational mobility narrowed the gap between the 
fishing  and  non-fishing  wage  rate  from  33  Baht 
(US$1.05 at 1 US$ = 31.18 Baht in 1997) to 2 Baht 
(US$0.06), but in Phang Nga province (Andaman 
Sea Coast) the gap widened from 4 Baht (US$0.13) 
to 50 Baht (US$1.60). However, Phang Nga was 
in temporary imbalance as a result of a decline in 
non-fishing activities, especially offshore tin min-
ing. In Phang Nga, there were temporary resource 
rents created partly by a recovery of the fishery, and 
partly by the fall in the opportunity cost of labor, 
following the decline in non-fishing activities.
The work of Panayotou and Panayotou (1986) sug-
gests the potential for new activities such as fish 
farming  and  cottage  industries.  However,  fishers 
are  already  engaged  in  a  variety  of  non-fishing 
activities and they are quite responsive to differen-
tial earnings between these and fishing. What is 
needed is the support for the activities that have 
been neglected in the past because of a bias towards 
fisheries development. Such support may be in the 
form of infrastructure, credit and dissemination of 
information  on  employment  opportunities,  new 
technologies and markets. Geographical mobility 
should be encouraged especially out of the isolated 
communities of Phang Nga, but not in other large 
urban centers like Bangkok. To forestall an influx 
of new entrants into fisheries as resource rents are 
created, it would be necessary to accompany the 
promotion of non-fishing alternatives with effective 
controls on entry, perhaps through the granting to 
the  small  scale  fishing  communities  of  exclusive 
territorial  rights to the coastal fisheries.
Competition and Conflicts in a Dualistic Sector
The last 30 years have revolutionized Thailand’s 
coastal fishing industry. Rapid and often unfettered 
development, however, has degraded the coastal 
resources and encouraged conflicts between large- 
and small scale fishing fleets and among small scale 
communities themselves. At the root of these inter- 
and intra-sectoral conflicts are uncontrolled devel-
opment of land and water concessions surrounding 
small scale communities, increasing competition, 
and the introduction of environmentally-destructive 
technology.
Land Encroachment
Many of Thailand’s small scale fishing communities 
live in marginal areas and they conduct most of 
their  fishing  activities  within  close  proximity  to 
where they live. This creates two types of problems.   
Firstly, small scale fishing communities tend to be 
highly  dependent  on  local  resources;  when  not 
fishing, they work in local, resource-intensive in-
dustries, such as rubber extraction and processing, 
rice farming or aquaculture.
Secondly, small scale fishing communities are ex-
tremely vulnerable to the negative effects of envi-
ronmental degradation. In particular, encroachment 
from land developers and environmentally-destruc-
tive technologies pose a substantial threat to small 
scale communities. Rubber plantations, for instance, 
take up land that could otherwise be used for farming, 
landing  fish  or  home-steading.  Likewise,  shrimp 
farms occupy large areas of land, employ little labor 
and discharge harmful chemicals into coastal areas.
These encroaching activities provide local commu-
nities with few economic benefits or opportunities 
and impose significant economic and environmental 
costs. Because of the lack of land title and power, 
local communities are often at the mercy of local 
entrepreneurs and government officials. The latter 
are particularly important as  they are responsible 
for  defining  and  enforcing  regulations  regarding 
land  use.  The  policy  of  local  land  departments 
seems to be one of laissez-faire, permitting a wide 
array of private concessions such as rubber planta-
tions and shrimp farms.
Over-exploitation of Coastal Fisheries
A  second  type  of  conflict  stems  from  escalating 
competition  between  small  scale  and  large  scale 
fishing communities, and among the small scale 
communities themselves. Conflicts between small 
scale and large scale fleets generally occur when the 
latter enter the fishing areas used by the small scale 
communities, degrading local fishing grounds, de-
pleting local fish stocks, or tearing up stationary 
gear. Conflicts among the small scale communities 
tend to follow the same general pattern, whereby 
fishing communities use destructive gear (such as 
push net or cyanide). 
There are many destructive technologies  pursuing 
fewer fish, creating persistent and violent conflicts 
within  Thailand’s  coastal  zones.  Surveys  by  the 592 WorldFish Center 593
Table 9. Effort and CPUE in the Gulf of Thailand, 1986 - 85.
Year
Fishing effort





1965 1 147 233
1966 2 051 177
1967 2 773 158
1968 3 493 147
1969 3 621 143
1970 3 875 137
1971 6 065 100
1972 7 362 97
1973 8 644 85
1974 6 382 93
1975 9 273 77
1976 7 726 92
1977 10 265 75
1978 8 806 81
1979 8 923 80
1980 8 847 62
1981 11 470 50
1982 12 296 49
1983 13 351 46
1984 10 390 60
1985 11 928 54
Source:  Somporn  et  al.  citing  Phasuk  and  Boobyubol  and  Pramok-
Chutima, 1990.
Fleet Operational Dynamics
The State of the Fishing Fleets
Fishing Fleet Classification
The marine capture fisheries can be broadly divided 
into commercial and small scale sub-sectors. Ves-
sels over 10 m in length or 5 GT which use modern 
fishing gear and have the capacity to fish offshore 
for several days, are classified as commercial vessels. 
They typically operate from the larger ports and 
commonly use ice to preserve their catch. Refrig-
eration is employed on some of the larger vessels. 
Small scale vessels are usually less than 10 m in 
length and either employ an outboard-engine or 
inboard-engine or are non-motorized. Most small 
scale fishers operate from fishing villages.  
According to the Marine Fisheries Census, a struc-
tural  change  in  Thailand’s  fisheries  took  place 
between 1985 and 1995. The overall number of 
fishing boats increased by 3.0% (Table 10); small 
scale fishing boats increased by 7.5% whereas com-
mercial  fishing  boats  decreased  by  11.0%.  One 
reason for the change was the creation of a boat-
tenure system within the commercial fishing sector, 
which resulted in a decrease in the number of boats 
per household.
Fishing Methods and Gear
Small scale vessels typically employ gillnets, small 
push nets, lift nets or other modern small scale 
gear, or alternatively set traps, bag nets and other 
stationary  gear  in  estuaries  or  protected  inshore 
waters. They rarely spend more than 12 hours at 
sea and generally fish within 5 km of the shore.   
Some fishers employ cast nets or hand-lines from 
the shore or from non-powered boats. The compo-
sition of the commercial fleet since 1958 is pro-
vided in Table 11. In theory, mechanized vessels 
using active gear must be licensed but in practice a 
significant  proportion  of  vessels  are  unlicensed.   
Trawlers and purse seiners are the most important 
components of the fleet. Push nets and gillnets also 
take significant catches.  
Department of Fisheries show that catch per unit of 
effort (CPUE) rates have been declining since the 
1960s (Table 9).  594 WorldFish Center 595
Year 
Pelagic fishing gear Demersal fishing gear




drift gillnet Trawlers2/ Push nets
1957 1 287 324 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1958 1 344 392 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1959 1 470 379 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1960 1 409 323 48 N/A 99 N/A
1961 918 251 233 N/A 201 N/A
1962 792 228 386 N/A 976 N/A
1963 662 212 537 N/A 2 026 N/A
1964 602 144 890 N/A 2 360 N/A
1965 697 226 634 N/A 2 393 N/A
1966 663 228 409 N/A 2 695 N/A
1967 447 278 417 N/A 3 077 N/A
1968 457 361 329 N/A 3 182 N/A
1969 374 314 224 N/A 3 185 N/A
1970 371 716 260 235 3 082 354
1971 313 475 244 151 3 608 610
1972 236 506 254 138 4 486 1 327
1973 189 680 228 231 5 837 1 628
1974 229 657 188 148 5 271 1 213
1975 262 625 187 177 4 962 1 075
1976 222 726 226 157 5 204 844
1977 242 706 314 244 6 288 1 177
1978 250 843 359 151 6 453 1 426
1979 258 681 256 227 8 747 1 923
1980 225 781 307 287 10 421 2 262
Table 10. Number of fishing boats classified by type of fishing operations, 1985 and 1995.
Year
Small scale Commercial scale Total
Number % % of change Number % % of change Number % % of change
19851/ 40 095 86.2 12 855 13.8 52 950 100
19952/ 43 092 86.7 7.5 11 446 13.3 -10.96 54 538 100 3.0
Sources: 1/ National Statistics Office and Department of Fisheries 1987.
               2/ National Statistics Office 1996.
Table 11. Number of selected types of gear (fishing units) registered and marine fish caught in Thailand, 1957 - 95.594 WorldFish Center 595
with outboard engines (long-tail). The boats’ aver-
age length was 7.0 m. About 94% of the engines 
were diesel and the average HP was 8.3 HP. 
Type of Gear and Definition of Gear Group 
Fishing units were classified by the type of gear 
employed. Some fishing units use a two-gear com-
bination,  three-gear  combination,  or  a  four-gear 
combination. Based on these criteria, three  groups 
of single gear, four of two-gear combination, one of 
three-gear combination and one four-gear combi-
nation were identified. 
Initial Investment and Variable Input Use
Initial Investment 
The initial investment in fishing assets (boat, en-
gine and gear) by type of gear group is given in 
Table 13a. Small scale fishing units had average 
Costs, Earnings and Profitability of Small 
Scale Fishing Operations
The study unit I was the fishing household in Songkla 
Province, Southern Thailand. Eight major fisheries 
in six villages along the coastal gulf of Thailand 
were selected. The major types of gear are shrimp 
gillnets,  cuttlefish  trammel  nets,  Indo-Pacific 
mackerel gillnets, other gillnets and Acetes trawl 
nets. The survey was made in May 1999, using the 
cross-sectional data for the previous year. The 33 
sample  fishing  households  were  selected  in  six 
villages. These households were grouped according 
to the major types of fishing gear used.
Characteristics of Fishing Operation
Fishing Boats and Engines 
Table 12 shows the details of fishing boats by type 
and size. About 93% of the boats were powered 
Table 11. Number of selected types of gear (fishing units) registered and marine fish caught in Thailand, 1957 - 95. (continued)
Year 
Pelagic fishing gear Demersal fishing gear




drift gillnet Trawlers2/ Push nets
1981 277 833 258 327 7 525 1 216
1982 233 840 238 281 11 475 1 899
1983 225 846 144 264 9 390 1 326
1984 254 961 245 265 9 131 960
1985 234 951 227 269 8 325 759
1986 258 996 203 329 7 407 664
1987 253 1 174 223 365 7 343 624
1988 231 1 456 146 461 6 950 531
1989 208 1 443 114 282 13 113 1 907
1990 188 1 629 101 299 12 905 1 879
1991 188 1 614 88 338 10 298 1 047
1992 204 1 452 72 362 9 465 818
1993 190 1 509 94 271 9 086 808
1994 190 1 511 99 280 8 346 651
1995 139 1 397 82 330 7 995 634
Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 1981 - 95.
Note: 1/ Chinese purse seine, Thai purse seine, Luring purse seine and Anchovy purse seine.
          2/ Otter trawl, Pair trawl and Beam trawl.
          N/A = Not available.596 WorldFish Center 597
Table 13a. A16 Initial investment of small scale fishing by types of fishing gear, Southern Thailand, 1998.
Types of fishing gear
Initial Investment (Bahts)
Boat Engine and equipment Fishing gear and equipment Total
Single gear:
    Shrimp gillnets
    Cuttlefish trammel nets
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    SCO 38 750 26 750 83 500 149 000
Four-gear combined:
    SCIO 46 000 34 750 102 250 183 000
Table  12.  Boats  and  engine  used  of  small  scale  fishing  operation, 
Southern Thailand, 1998.
Items Number of sample %
Type of boats: 33 100.0
    Outboard 32 97.0
    Inboard 1 3.0
Length of boat: 33 100.0
    Less than 6 meters 4 12.1
    6 - 8 meters 27 81.8
    9 - 10 meters 2 6.1
Average boat length: 7.0 meters
Type of engine: 33 100.0
    Benzene 2 6.1
    Diesel 31 93.9
Engine power: 33 100.0
    Less than 6 HP 11 33.3
    6 - 10 HP 21 63.6
    More than 10 HP 1 3.0
Average engine power: 8.29 HP
investment assets worth 63 316 - 201 000 Baht 
(US$ 1 531 - 4 861 at 1 US$ = 41.35 Baht in 1998). 
The highest initial investment was in the OA (other 
gillnets and Acetes trawl net) gear, while the lowest 
was in shrimp gillnets. 
 
Variable Input Use
The main variable inputs used were labor, nets and 
fuel, with the operator’s household providing the 
main source of crew. Among the fishing villages 
they were all similar in family labor, with an average 
of 1.0 - 1.7 persons per fishing unit, using  all types 
of fishing gear. There were significant differences in 
person-days (based on an 8-hour day) of family 
labor and wider differences between gear groups 
(Table 13b).
Cost Structure 
Fixed  cost  is  the  cost  that  does  not  depend  on 
the level of fishing operations but on the value of 
fishing assets. This may be 28.9% of total costs for 
shrimp gillnets, 35.0% for cuttlefish trammel nets 
and 31.9% for Indo-Pacific mackerel gillnets (Table 
14a), all of which are single gear. There was a sig-
nificant difference in the share of fixed costs be-
tween two-gear combination, three-gear and four-
gear combination operations. 596 WorldFish Center 597
Table 13b. Labor input use by types of small scale fishing gear, Southern Thailand, 1998.
Types of fishing gear
No. of fishing No. of family No. of person-day
day (days)
labors 
(persons) Family labor Hired labor Total
Single gear:
    Shrimp gillnets
    Cuttlefish trammel nets
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    SCO 254 1.7 302 127 429
Four-gear combined:
    SCIO 291 1.2 301 248 549
Note: SC = Shrimp gillnets, and Cuttlefish trammel nets  OA = Others gillnets, and Acetes trawl nets
          SI = Shrimp gillnets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets  SCO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Other gillnets
          CI = Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets  SCIO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, Indo-pacific
              mackerel gillnets, and Other gillnets
Variable costs ranged from 65.0% to 71.1% of total 
fishing costs for single gear groups. This included 
hired labor, which is the main cash cost component. 
It accounted for about 25.9% - 48.7% of total costs 
in the case of two-gear combinations, and as much 
as 42.7% in the case of three-gear combinations.  
In general, fixed costs consisted of interest on debt, 
depreciation of fishing assets and the opportunity 
cost of owned capital. Variable costs consisted of 
payment to hired labor, fuel, opportunity cost of 
family labor and  nets, ice, fees and maintenance.   
Total cost and its components  varied considerably 
among gear types (Table 14b). Single gear groups 
averaged a total cost of 36 263 - 98 873 Baht (US$ 
877 - 2 391 in 1998) per year whereas two-gear 
combined operations ranged between 120 588 and 
240  510  Baht  (US$2  916  -  5  816  in  1998).  In 
addition, three-gear combined operations averaged 
a total cost of 196 548 Baht (US$4 753) per year, 
whereas four-gear combined operations averaged 
232 162 Baht (US$5 615). CI gear groups (cuttle-
fish trammel nets with Indo-Pacific mackerel gill-
nets) had the highest total cost with an average cost 
of 240 510 Baht (US$5 816) per year while Indo-
Pacific mackerel gillnets had the lowest, with an 
average total cost of 36 263 Baht (US$877) per 
year. This is an indication of the  dualism in coastal 
fisheries, i.e. one type of gear group has annual 
expenses over 10 times higher than that of another 
gear group. As noted, the latter is more than 10 
times more profitable than the former, although 
profitability is not always correlated with the scale 
of operations, as reflected in total fishing costs or 
in the capital cost of the fishing assets. 
Species Composition of Catch and Revenue Structure 
The catch consists of a variety of species commanding 
such widely diverging prices that aggregate catch 
figures make little sense. This is due to the multi-
species nature of the fisheries in coastal areas and 
the non-discriminating gear employed. Although to-
tal value of catch is more meaningful than quantity, 
the relative contribution of different species to val-
ue, as well as the individual catch and unit price of 
these important fish species, is important. 
The  fishers  direct  their  effort  toward  high  value 
species such as shrimp, cuttlefish, pomfret fish and 
crab but they obtain as by-catch low-value species 
called  trash  fish.  There  is  considerable  variation 
among gear groups in both the catch of individual 
species per year and the price obtained (Table 15).   598 WorldFish Center 599
Table 14b. Major cost items (Baht/year) per fishing unit by types of fishing gear, Southern Thailand, 1998.
Type of gear combination
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    SCO 22 999 5 850 83 850 16 300 12 934 54 616 113 083 83 465 196 548
Four-gear combined:
    SCIO 45 820 5 160 70 700 33 757 30 657 46 069 135 113 97 049 232 162
Note: SC = Shrimp gillnets, and Cuttlefish trammel nets  OA = Others gillnets, and Acetes trawl nets
          SI = Shrimp gillnets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets  SCO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Other gillnets
          CI = Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets  SCIO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, Indo-pacific 
          Opp = Opportunity             mackerel gillnets and Other gillnets
Table 14a. Cost structure of small scale fishing operation by types of fishing gear, Southern Thailand, 1998.
Type of gear combination
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    SCO 11.7 3.0 14.7 42.7 8.3 6.6 27.8 85.3 100.0
Four-gear combined:
    SCIO 19.7 2.2 22.0 30.5 14.5 13.2 19.8 78.0 100.0
The OA groups, on the average, obtain larger quan-
tities and receive lower prices than shrimp gillnetters 
and other groups. The former’s less valuable catch, 
such as trash fish, contributes sufficiently to total 
revenue to be considered more of a target catch 
than a low-price fish.  For example, mackerel fish 
and edible fish contributed almost 94.1% of the 
total (Table 15) 598 WorldFish Center 599
Table 15. Annual catch fishing unit and composition of catch by types of small scale fishing gear, Southern Thailand, 1998.













fish Shrimp Crab Cephalopods
Single gear:
    Shrimp gillnets
    Cuttlefish trammel nets
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    SCO 8 306 28.6 22 46.2 0.0 1.5 7.8 22.1
Four-gear combined:
    SCIO 6 846 37.5 18 55.1 0.0 2.2 6.9 18.0
Note: SC = Shrimp gillnets, and Cuttlefish trammel nets  OA = Others gillnets, and Acetes trawl nets
          SI = Shrimp gillnets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets  SCO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Other gillnets
          CI = Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets  SCIO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, Indo-pacific 
              mackerel gillnets and Other gillnets
Fishing Income and Profit
Gross Revenue 
As expected, the highest value of catch or gross 
revenue  was  found  in  the  CI  gear  groups  with 
330 495 Baht (US$7 993 in 1998) per year followed 
by the SCIO gear group (shrimp gillnets, cuttlefish 
trammel  nets,  Indo-Pacific  mackerel  gillnets  and 
other gillnets) at 256 652 Baht (US$6 207) per year 
(Table  16).  The  lowest  gross  revenues  were  ob-
served among the single gear groups and averaged 
between 75 017 - 89 584 Baht (US$1 814 - 2 166) 
per year. This indicates that the value of catch by 
fishing gear group reflects the availability of fisher-
ies resources. 
 
Gross Family Income 
Gross  family  income  is  obtained  by  subtracting 
cash costs from gross revenues and is the maximum 
income from fishing that the household can con-
sume in the short-run. It is not, however, sustain-
able over the long run, because no allowance is 
made for depreciation of fishing assets. There were 
several  gear  groups  (e.g.  shrimp  gillnetters)  that 
earned gross incomes that would not have allowed   
bare  subsistence  without  supplementary  income 
from non-fishing sources (Table 16).  
Net Family Income 
Net  family  income  is  obtained  by  subtracting 
depreciation from gross family income and can be 
consumed  in  its  entirety  without  impairing  the 
household’s ability to continue fishing in the fu-
ture. Net family income consists of returns to  the 
family on factors such as capital, family labor and 
management, and rents, such as resource rent and 
rents from ability (e.g. rent is a ‘wage’ for some 
fixed resource like land). All households had posi-
tive net family incomes. However, the single gear 
groups (shrimp gillnetters) had extremely low net 
family incomes. The CI fishing unit group was the 
highest income group (Table 16). 
Operating Profit 
Operating profit (or gross economic profit), is de-
fined as the difference between gross revenues and 
operating (or variable) costs. The importance of this 
measure of profitability lies in the economic prin-
ciple that zero operating profits forms the dividing 
point  between  operation  and  close-down  in  the 
short-run. As long as operating (or variable) costs 
are covered, the fishing unit can continue operat-
ing  until  either  the  situation  improves  or  fixed 
assets can be liquidated. Again, single gear groups 600 WorldFish Center 601
Table 16. Profitability (Baht/year) by types of small scale fishing gear, Southern Thailand, 1998.
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    SCO 237 552 124 469 101 470 69 852 41 004
Four-gear combined:
    SCIO 256 652 256 652 210 832 75 470 24 490
Note: SC = Shrimp gillnets, and Cuttlefish trammel nets  OA = Others gillnets, and Acetes trawl nets
          SI = Shrimp gillnets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets  SCO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Other gillnets
          CI = Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets  SCIO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, Indo-pacific 
              mackerel gillnets and Other gillnets
(shrimp gillnetters)  had very low operating profits. 
The five most profitable types of gear were CI, SI, 
SCIO, OA and SCO, respectively (Table 16). 
 
Net Economic Profit 
Net profits were calculated by deducting fixed costs 
from  operating  profit  to  determine  the  long-run 
profitability of various types of fishing gear. On   
strictly economic criteria, fishing units not covering 
their total costs (i.e. having negative net profits)   
leave the fisheries in the long-run, switching to the 
next  best  alternative  from  which,  by  definition, 
they could earn more. If net profits  are made, new 
fishing units are attracted into  open-access fisheries, 
until all pure profits (net profits minus manage-
ment costs) disappear due to competion.   
 
The  most  profitable  types  of  gear  were  CI  gear 
groups making a profit 89 985 Baht (US$2 176 in 
1998) per year, followed by SI gear groups, Indo-
Pacific  mackerel  gillnets  and  SCO  gear  groups, 
at an average 48 572 Baht (US$1 175) per year, 
41 816 Baht (US$1 011) per year and 41 004 Baht 
(US$992) per year, respectively. Cuttlefish trammel 
net, shrimp gillnets and SC gear groups suffered 
greater losses than other groups, due to high operat-
ing costs and small catches. SCIO and OA gear groups 
also earned a reasonable profit, slightly more than 
24 490 Baht (US$592) per year and 20 005 Baht 
(US$484) per year respectively. (Table 16).
Factor Returns 
In  terms  of  returns  to  labor,  OA  gear  groups 
paid the highest wage rate at 272 Baht (US$6.58) 
per person-day mostly by share, followed by CI 
gear groups, 266 Baht (US$6.43), shrimp gillnet, 
146 Baht (US$3.53) and SI gear groups, 264 Baht 
(US$ 6.38). The returns to labor for three types of 
gear  groups  namely,  SC,  SCO  and  Indo-Pacific 
mackerel  gillnets  were  below  the  national  mini-
mum wage rate of 164 Baht (US$3.97) per person-
day in 1998 (Table 17). 
The returns on capital, that is, profit as a percentage 
of investment cost, was highest in the case of CI 
and CS gear groups because of the very high profit 
involved. The concept of returns on capital makes 
little sense for small scale fishing units.  
Explaining Variation in Profitability 
The high returns for CI and SI gear groups reflect 
the fishing skills and entrepreneurial ability of their 
operators as well as of the abundance of fisheries 600 WorldFish Center 601
                     Table 17. Return to investment and labor by types of small scale fishing gear Southern Thailand, 1998.
Types of gear Return to investment (%) Return to labor (Baht/person-day)
Single gear:
    Shrimp gillnets
    Cuttlefish trammel nets
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    SCO 31 140
Four-gear combined:
   SCIO 16 213
                    Note: SC = Shrimp gillnets, and Cuttlefish trammel nets
                              SI = Shrimp gillnets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets
                              CI = Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets
                              OA = Others gillnets, and Acetes trawl nets
                              SCO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, and Other gillnets
                              SCIO = Shrimp gillnets, Cuttlefish trammel nets, Indo-pacific mackerel gillnets and Other gillnets
resources in the Songkla coastal area. Thus, this 
return consists partly of rents of ability and quasi-
rents for fixed factors and partly of resource rents.   
This  is also reflected in the higher wages paid by 
these two  gear groups. From the society’s point of 
view, it appears that there are  grounds for main-
taining these gear groups and their contribution to 
employment and fish production. 
 
The most important determinant of profit appears 
to be the interaction between types of gear and fish-
ing grounds. Having the right type of gear at the 
right  fishing  grounds  with  appropriate  skill  and 
entrepreneurial spirit appears to be the recipe for 
high profits. These three components are present in 
the three most successful types of fishing group, CI 
gear groups, SI gear groups and Indo-Pacific mack-
erel  gillnets.  The  question  is  how  a  small  scale 
Songkla fisher with a relatively large debt and small 
funds of his own can take advantage of changing 
economic conditions by acquiring a shrimp gillnet.   
 
The small scale fishers in the Songkla coastal area 
are in the worst possible situation because of the 
paucity of funds, of fish resources and of non-fish-
ing alternatives. In this situation, not only credit 
and training are necessary but eventually relocation 
of the surplus fishers is inevitable, unless imagina-
tive government projects such as small scale coastal 
aquaculture developments provide viable alterna-
tives to coastal fishing. 
Costs, Earnings and Profitability of Com-
mercial Fishing Operations 
This section is confined  to  operations of commercial 
fishing vessels, which use six major types of fishing 
gear, accounting for approximately 75% of the total 
quantity of marine products caught. The types of 
gear are otter trawls, pair trawls, beam trawls, push 
nets, purse seines and king mackerel gillnets. The 
various types of gear are applied in different sized   
fishing vessels. The study therefore concentrated  on 
size of fishing vessels. Data were obtained from 100 
samples. The survey was made in April - May 1996 
and obtained the cross-sectional data for the previous 
year’s activities  in Thai waters. 
Classification of commercial fishing operations varies. 
In this study, the length of fishing boats is used  to 
be comparable with the classification used by the 
Department of Fisheries. (Gross tonnage and en-
gine power have a correlation with vessel length of 
0.95 and 0.75, respectively). Otter trawl boats are 
further classified into three categories, i.e. < 14 m, 
14 - 18 m and 18 - 25 m. Pair trawls (one fishing 602 WorldFish Center 603
unit comprising two vessels) are  classified into the 
same three categories: < 14 m, 14 - 18 m and 18 - 
25 m. Beam trawlers are  classified into two catego-
ries, i.e. < 14 m and > 14 m. Push net  boats  and purse 
seiners are classified into three categories: < 14 m, 
14 - 18 m and 18 - 25 m. Other fishing boats  like 
king  mackerel  gillnetters  are  classified  into  two 
categories, 14 - 18 m and 18 - 25 m.
 
Inputs Use in Fishing Operations
In fishing operations, two major inputs are applied: 
labor or crew (hired labor and family labor) and 
materials, i.e. fuel, oil, ice and others (containers and 
food). Table 18 indicates that  the number of crew in 
trawlers  increases with vessel size, i.e. 3 - 14 crew are 
needed with otter trawls, 4 - 8 are needed with pair 
trawl vessels and 3 - 5 are needed with beam trawl 
vessels. Vessels deploying push nets require  3 - 5 
crew. As for purse seiners, a large number of crew 
(17  -  25)  is  needed.  Finally,  vessels  with  king 
mackerel gillnets require 9 - 10 crew. Small otter 
trawls can work at sea for 10.6 months per year, 
but  time  spent  fishing  depends  on  the  weather 
(monsoon), and Government measures that specify 
closed seasons during  spawning of some  resources.
The  unit  “person-day”  measures  the  services  of 
labor  used  in  fishing  operations.  Otter  trawlers 
utilize 103 - 210 person-days, pair trawlers of all 
sizes need 122 - 255 person-days, beam trawlers 
and push netters of all sizes need  43 - 120 person-
days  and  46  -  63  person-days  respectively.  The 
number  of  person-days  needed  in  purse  seiners 
varies from 374 - 575 while king mackerel gillnetters 
need 171 - 200 person-days per month.  
Apart from labor, the other most important input 
in fishing operations is fuel, especially for trawls 
and push nets where the engines have to operate 
during harvesting. Fuel consumption per month 
varies depending on the types of vessels: 4 537 - 
10 693 litres for otter trawls (from small to large 
sizes), 12 032 - 21 547 litres for pair trawls and 
3 559 - 15 915 litres for push nets. While the  fuel 
consumption  is  much  less  in  purse  seiners  and 
gillnetters than trawlers, these vessels do not differ 
significantly  in  size  and  fishing  gear.  Fuel  con-
sumption per month is between 4 730 - 10 521 
litres for purse seiners and 3 563 - 5 145 litres for 
gillnetters.  
Preservation of marine products during and after 
harvesting is important for the quality and price of 
products. Currently, ice is mainly used; the amount   
required  depends  on  the  duration  of  the  trip.   
Otter trawlers (< 14 m), beam trawlers and push 
netters that spend only 1 - 2 days per trip require 
0.01 - 5.3 t of ice per month. Larger fishing vessels 
require 11.7 - 26.3 t per month; king mackerel 




Species and volume of catch differ according to the 
type of gear, and the fish harvested with similar 
types of gear further differs according to boat size. 
Table 19 indicates that monthly catch by each otter 
trawler has a volume between 8 027 and 39 593 t. 
Most of the catch is trash fish, comprising  45.4 - 
62.5% of the total catch. Edible fish comprises 14.4 
- 29.1% of the total catch. Small otter trawls (< 14 m) 
harvest shrimp comprising 31.8% of the total catch, 
but most are small size. Average catch per month 
of pair trawlers for all boat sizes varies between 
25 316 and 57 921 t. The catch is completely dif-
ferent among small pair trawlers (< 14 m), medium 
pair trawlers (14 - 18 m) and large pair trawlers
 (18 - 25 m). Medium and large pair trawlers have a 
similar ratio of catch, i.e. edible fish, trash fish and 
cephalopods comprising 18.1 - 24.3%, 51.5 - 59.0% 
and 10.9 - 18.2% of total catch respectively. Aver-
age catch per month of beam trawlers for both boat 
sizes varies between 817 and 4 157 t. Shrimp com-
prises a large proportion of beam trawl catch, but 
most shrimp caught are small in size and  receive 
low  prices.  Medium  beam  trawlers  also  catch  a 
large  quantity  of  cephalopods  which  comprises 
27% of total catch. Finally, all sizes of push netter 
have a similar ratio of catch, i.e. edible fish, trash 
fish,  shrimp  and  cephalopods  are  caught  in  the 
ratios 6.5 - 8.4%, 54.5 - 60.7%, 16.5 - 21.3% and 
3.1 - 5.2% of total catch respectively. 
Catch obtained from purse seiners and gillnetters 
consists mainly of edible fish making 31.0 - 80.0% 
of total catch.  Catch by size of purse seiner varies 
between 36 760 and 55 351 t per month. Most 
of the catch is  economic pelagic species, i.e. Indo-
Pacific  mackerel  and  sardinellas.  King  mackerel 
gillnet is the fishing gear  catching high quality fish 
of similar size, with average price per kg of about 
37.49 - 41.05 Baht (US$0.91 - 0.99), while the av-
erage price of other fish caught by purse seines is 
between 6.86 - 9.55 Baht (US$0.17 - 0.23) per kg. 
Major pelagic fish caught are king mackerel and 
little mummy.602 WorldFish Center 603
Table 18. Variable input use per fishing unit by type and size of vessels, 1995.
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Investment costs consist of three parts, i.e. the in-
vestment in the hull, (all wooden hulls); the invest-
ment in the engine and other navigational aids; and 
the investment in fishing gear and equipment. Ini-
tial investment in fishing operations varies accord-
ing to type and size of fishing boat. The ratio of 
initial  investment  to  number  of  crew  indicates 
capital intensity of each type and category of fishing 
vessel (Smith and Mines 1982).
Investment Costs of Demersal Fishing Gear  
Capital investment for different types of trawlers 
primarily depends on hull construction. Thus the 
cost for hull construction of otter trawlers and pair 
trawlers  comprises  an  average  50%  and  42%  of 
total investment, respectively. Table 20 shows that 
capital outlay on otter trawlers of small size differs 
on the average from 423 225 Baht (US$10 235 in 
1998) to 2 220 907 Baht (US$53 710), a 5.2 times 
difference. This is because the size of < 14 m is 
mainly for coastal fisheries and merely needs used 
engines, which cost less, and the gear is also not 
expensive. Otter trawlers of > 18 m in length em-
ploy modern equipment, such as echo-sounder and 
radar, etc. The ratio of capital to number of crew, 
which measures capital intensity, slowly increases 
according to size of boat ranging from a low of 
105 806 : 1 to a high of 277 613 : 1. Capital invest-
ment  in  pair  trawlers  does  not  differ  signifi-
cantly with boat size for several reasons. Fishing 
grounds are not far from shore, vessels can only 
operate during day-time and less fishing gear and 
equipment are needed compared with otter trawls 
of similar size. Capital outlay from small to large 
fishing  boat  sizes  (<  14  m  up  to  18  -  25  m  in 
length) is  between 1 197 825 Baht (US$28 968) to 
3 895 937 Baht (US$94 218) per unit, or a differ-
ence  of  3.3  times.  Capital  intensity  ranges  from 
119 783 : 1 to 278 281 : 1,  a difference of 2.3 times. 604 WorldFish Center 605
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Source: Fisheries Economics Division, Department of Fisheries 1995.
Table 19. Catch, value of catch and catch composition per fishing unit by type and size of vessels, 1995. 
As for beam trawlers, capital outlay ranges from 
71 881 Baht (US$1 738) to 313 383 Baht (US$7 579) 
on the average, a difference of about 4.4 times.  
Capital outlay on small-sized push net vessels ranges 
from 132 357 Baht (US$3 201) to 1 031 030 Baht 
(US$24 934), a difference of 7.8 times. This size   
boat, < 14 m, is mainly used in coastal fisheries and 
needs only used engines that cost less. Fishing gear 
is not complicated and requires only low invest-
ment. On the other hand, push netters of 18 - 25 m 
in length employ modern equipment. The capital-
labor ratio increases according to size of boat from 
44 119 : 1 to 206 206 : 1.
Investment Cost of Pelagic Fishing Gear 
Capital  investment  in  pelagic  fisheries  such  as 
purse seiners and king mackerel gillnetters differs 
from trawl fisheries, in that investment in assets for 
equipment is more than that for the hull. Purse 
seine investment in equipment and gear requires 
higher  investment  compared  to  other  types  of   
boat. Between 53.6 and 74.9% of total investment 
is for equipment and 16.0 to 30.9% is needed for 
the  hull.  Investment  in  gear  and  equipment  for 
king  mackerel  gillnetters  is  52.8%  and  54.4% 
of total capital outlay respectively, while the cost 
of  hull  is  between  31.5%  and  33.3%  of  total 
costs. Table 20 indicates that of all  pelagic fishing 
gear, large purse seiners (18 - 25 m) require the 
highest investment at an average of 4 339 790 Baht 
(US$104 953) per unit, followed by medium size 
(14 - 18 m), requiring an average capital outlay of   
2 743 886 Baht (US$ 66 356) per unit. King mack-
erel  gillnetters  require  an  average  capital  invest-
ment of  1 989 489 to 2 666 849 Baht (US$48 113 
- 64 494) per unit. King mackerel gillnetters have 
the highest capital intensity ranging from  221 054 : 1 
to 266 685 : 1, while purse seiners (< 14 m) have 604 WorldFish Center 605
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Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 1995.
Note: * Capital/crew ratio indicating investment cost per crew.
the lowest capital intensity at 107 308 : 1. This is 
because  king  mackerel  gillnetters  require  less 
labor than any other type of fishing boat. 
Cost Structure
Inputs in fishing operations are divided into two 
main groups, fixed input or fixed assets invested, 
and variable inputs. Fixed cost or input consists of 
the  depreciation  cost  of  durable  assets  (boats, 
engine, and other durable equipment), the oppor-
tunity cost of capital (measured at an interest rate 
of 12%) and the interest cost on debt. These costs 
are incurred whether there are fishing operations or 
not. Variable cost or input consists of three sub-
parts, revolving cost (fuel and oil, ice and repair 
costs),  labor  cost  (hired  labor,  family  labor  and 
food) and marketing costs (commission, transport 
and various fees).
The cost structure in Table 21 shows that for all 
types of fishing gear, the main costs are variable 
costs at 73.5 - 89.4% of the total cost (variable plus 
fixed) with 7.0 - 26.5% of total costs as fixed cost. 
Trawlers and push netters have high fuel and oil 
expenses, i.e. 32.1 - 51.0% of total costs. Variable 
costs of purse seiners and gillnetters differ in that   
the  majority  of  expenses  are  for  labor  at  26.5  - 
51.0% of total costs, and only 16.0 - 21.1% of total 
cost is fuel expense. Trawl and push net fisheries, 
with their high proportion of fuel costs, have a high 
degree of instability due to the possibility of fuel 
price  changes  or  the  introduction  of  fuel-saving 
measures during a period of scarcity. 606 WorldFish Center 607
Table 21. Cost structure by type and size of vessels, 1995.
Type of fishing gear
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Source: Fisheries Economics Division, Department of Fisheries 1995.
Monthly Fishing Costs
Fishing  effort  by  different  types  of  fishing  gear 
varies  greatly  throughout  the  year,  whether  by 
the number of trips, days or months of operation. 
Costs  of  various  types  of  fishing  operation  also 
differ per trip, per month or per year. To standard-
ize the costs this study uses the average cost per 
month (total costs per year divided by number of 
months in operation). Apart from dividing costs as 
fixed and variable, it is also possible to divide them 
into  cash  and  imputed  costs  (depreciation  cost, 
opportunity cost of capital and opportunity cost of 
family labor) as discussed below.
Otter Trawls
This type of fishing operation requires 25 - 26 days 
of operation per month. From Table 22, the aver-
age total cost per vessel of large size (18 - 25 m) is 
maximum at 227 520 Baht (US$5 502 in 1998) per 
month, followed by 14 - 18 m size at 158 851 Baht 
(US$3 842), and then at < 14 m, 77 866 Baht (US$ 
1 883). The majority of these costs are for fuel and 
oil, crew, ice, repairs and maintenance, interest on 
debt  and  others  (marketing  expenses,  food  and 
fees).  Fuel  comprises  the  highest  cash  expense 
followed by crew cost. Pair trawls (18 - 25 m) incur 
higher costs for repair than crew costs owing to 
high investment in modern equipment, as well as 
by fishing offshore. The imputed costs for depreci-
ation, opportunity cost of capital and family labor 
make up an average of 16% of total cost.606 WorldFish Center 607
Table 22. Cost items (Baht·month-1) per fishing unit by type and size of vessels, 1995.
Type of fishing 
gear
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Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 1995.
Pair Trawl 
A pair trawl consists of two boats, making its cost 
of  operation  higher  than  other  type  of  fishing 
operation of similar size. It requires 17 - 27 days of 
operation per month. Table 22 indicates that the 
highest monthly operation costs are incurred by 
the large pair trawlers (18 - 25 m) at 460 852 Baht 
(US$11 145), followed by the medium size (14 - 
18 m) at 290 538 Baht (US$7 026) and the smaller 
size (< 14 m) at 243 483 Baht (US$5 888). Most 
costs are cash,  averaging  about 85% of total costs. 
Fuel  and  oil  comprise  the  highest  cash  costs 
followed by crew cost, repairs and maintenance, ice 
and others. The rest are imputed costs (deprecia-
tion, opportunitycost of capital and family labor) 
at 15% of total costs.
Beam Trawls
Beam  trawls  require  17  -  24  days  of  operation 
per month. Table 22 indicates that medium beam 
trawls (> 14 m) incur the highest monthly opera-
tion costs at 105 796 Baht (US$2 558), while the 
small size (< 14 m) incurs costs of 27 361 Baht 
(US$662).  Most  costs  are  cash,  averaging  about 
84% of total costs. Fuel and oil comprise the highest 
cash  costs,  followed  by  crew  cost,  repairs  and 
maintenance, ice and others. The rest are imputed 
costs (depreciation, opportunity cost of capital and 
family labor), at 16% of total costs.608 WorldFish Center 609
Push Nets
This type of fishing operation requires between 20 
and 25 days of operation per month. The average 
total cost per vessel of large size (18 - 25 m) is 
maximum at 235 358 Baht (US$5 692) per month, 
followed  by  14  -18  m  size  vessels  and  <  14  m 
vessels at 126 210 Baht (US$3 052) and 66 033 
Baht (US$1 597) respectively (Table 22). The ma-
jority of these are costs for fuel and oil, crew, ice, 
repairs and maintenance, interest on debt and others 
(marketing expenses, food and fees). Fuel comprises 
the highest cash expense, followed by crew cost. 
Imputed costs (depreciation, opportunity cost of 
capital and family labor) comprise on the average 
18% of total cost.
Thai Purse Seines
The three sizes of purse seine operations involve 22 
- 23 days per month. Total costs of operation of 
large boats (18 - 25 m), medium boats (14 -18 m) 
and small boats (< 14 m) are 440 744 Baht (US$ 
10 659), 301 477 Baht (US$7 291) and 239 510 
Baht (US$5 792) per month respectively. Most of 
these costs are cash expenses, averaging 88% of 
total costs. These costs consist of wages and crew 
share, fuel and oil, repairs and maintenance, ice, 
interest  charge  on  debt  (fixed  cost)  and  others. 
Cash expenses differ from those of trawl and push 
net operations because wages and crew share are 
the largest expenses while imputed costs (consist-
ing of depreciation, opportunity cost of capital and 
family labor) constitute 12% of total costs. Family 
labor  cost  in  large  purse  seine  boats  is  3  times 
higher than that of the small boats due to more 
family  members  being  employed  in  large  purse 
seine boats (Table 22).
King Mackerel Gillnets
This  type  of  gear  requires  the  lowest  cost  of  all 
types of pelagic fishing. Operations of king mack-
erel gillnets involve 19 - 20 days·month-1, and have 
an average cost between 143 852 Baht (US$3 479) 
and 253 964 Baht (US$6 142)·boat-1·month-1. Cash 
cost comprises 80% of total costs, the majority of 
which are wages and crew share averaging 47 850 
- 63 836 Baht (US$1 157 - 1 544)·boat-1·month-1. 
The cost of ice to preserve fish is only 4 328 - 6 486 
Baht (US$105 - 157)·month-1 (Table 22), which is 
minimal when compared with other gear types of 
similar size. This is due to the fact that catch by 
gillnets is good quality and of large size. In some 
boats, king mackerel are salted soon after harvest, 
thereby requiring less ice, but requiring salt, (in-
cluded  under  the  item  “others”).  Imputed  costs 
consist of about 20% of the total cost, more than 
half of which are opportunity cost of capital and 
the rest are depreciation cost and opportunity cost 
of family labor.
Share System
Among the stated operational costs, the wages of 
crew  are significant. They rank second to fuel cost, 
especially  for  pelagic  fishing,  which  incurs  the 
highest  crew  cost.  Benefit  sharing  between  crew 
and boat owner differ according to the type and 
size of boats. Benefit sharing can be classified into 
two systems: (1) wage or salary payment, and (2) 
sharing  value of products sold. Systems of sharing 
have different effects on risk. In the regular wage 
system,  risk  (including  expected  profit)  in  both 
catch and its price for each trip, solely belongs to 
the boat owners. Crew receive definite wages but 
lose the opportunity of sharing in the event of a 
good harvest. In the sharing system, both crew and 
boat owners jointly share the risk in catch and its 
price. The fixed wage system induces less enthusi-
asm from the crew, although the benefit-sharing 
system is risky due to lack of regular income and 
job security as in other sectors. This leads to the 
adoption of a mixed system of part regular wage 
and part sharing in the value of the catch. 
The sharing system differs according to type and 
size of fishing gear. In small otter trawls < 14 m 
in length, about 80% of cases studied employed 
fixed wages. Medium and large sized otter trawls 
(14 - 18 m and 18 - 25 m) employ a mixed system. 
Between  50  -  75%  of  pair  trawls  employ  fixed 
wages. Most of the beam trawls and push nets use 
benefit sharing based on net value of catch after 
deduction of operating expenses. This net value is 
divided in a ratio of 7 : 3 between boat owner and 
crew. The crew share is divided according to rank 
and responsibility with the master fisher receiving 
the biggest share. If the catch is higher than the 
target, the crew receives a bonus, in addition to 
regular wages and shares. Taking into account all 
benefits,  crew  members  of  medium  size  push 
netters (14 -18 m) receive an average of 8 588 Baht 
(US$208)·month-1 (Table 23). As for pair trawlers, 
each crew member of a small boat (14 - 18 m) 
receives 4 197 Baht (US$102)·month-1.
Pay for purse seiners and gillnetters is based on a 608 WorldFish Center 609
Table 23. The sharing system by type and size of vessels, 1995
Type of fishing gear
No. of 
crews
Percentage of fishing units by type of sharing system
Average crew cost 
(Baht·month-1)
Fixed wages Share Fixed wages & share per fishing unit per crew
Otter trawls
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Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 1995.
mixed system of fixed monthly wage and sharing   
catch  value.  About  82  -  91%  of  purse  seiners 
and 75 - 76% of gillnetters use this system. Net 
value after the deduction of expenses is divided 
between boat owners and crew in a ratio of 6 : 4 in 
the  case  of  king  mackerel  drift  gillnet  vessels. 
Among all types of purse seine and gillnet boats, 




Gross  revenues  are  the  total  value  of  the  catch.   
Gross revenue of large  pair trawlers (18 - 25 m) is 
highest at 521 289 Baht (US$12 607)·month-1 and 
lowest for small beam trawlers (<14 m) at 34 129 
Baht (US$825)·month-1 (Table 24). Gross revenue 
of  trawling  varies  significantly  among  boat  sizes 
(Table  24).  Three  sizes  of  otter  trawler  namely, 
small, medium and large yield revenues of 79 249 
Baht (US$1 917), 196 227 Baht (US$4 746), and 
290  158  Baht  (US$7  017)·month-1  respectively. 
Small boats have gross revenue 2.5 times less than 
medium-size  boats,  but  medium-size  boats  have 
gross revenue close to that of large boats. Three sizes 
of push netters namely, small, medium and large 
yield revenues of 67 802 Baht (US$1 640), 128 690 
Baht (US$3 112), and 242 650 Baht (US$5 868) 
·month-1 respectively. Gross revenue of large purse 
seiners  (18  -  25  m)  is  highest  at  528  602  Baht 
(US$ 12 784)·month-1 and lowest for medium-size 
king mackerel gillnetters (14 - 18 m) at 153 946 
Baht (US$3 723)·month-1.
Cash Flow
Cash flow indicates the highest revenue received 
and is derived from gross revenue less total cash 
costs. Cash flow of trawlers and push netters and 610 WorldFish Center 611
large pair trawlers (18 - 25 m) have the highest at 
138  325  Baht  (US$3  345)·month-1,  while  small 
beam trawlers (< 14 m) have the lowest cash flow at 
14 482 Baht (US$350)·month-1. Large purse seine 
boats (18 - 25 m) have the highest cash flow of 102 
490  Baht  (US$2  479)·month-1  and  medium-size 
gillnetters (14 - 18 m) have the lowest cash flow at 
40 268 Baht (US$974)·month-1.
Net Income
Net income is cash income less depreciation. This 
value indicates the fisher’s ability to sustain a long-
term fishing operation. Net income is the return 
on  inputs such as capital, family labor, manage-
ment and rent (resource rents and rents of ability). 
In  demersal  fisheries,  the  highest  net  income  is 
received by large pair trawlers (18 - 25 m), totaling   
108 437 Baht (US$2 622)·month-1 and the lowest 
net income is for small beam trawlers (< 14 m) 
at 13 764 Baht (US$333)·month-1 (Table 24). Large 
purse  seiners  (18  -  25  m)  yield  the  highest  net 
income at 131 676 Baht (US$3 184)·month-1 and 
medium-size gillnetters yield the lowest net income 
at 34 646 Baht (US$838)·month-1.
Operating Profit
Operating  profit  is  the  difference  between  gross 
revenue and variable costs. Operating profit indi-
cates whether a fishing operator can continue to 
operate during the working life of running assets.     
Table 24. Profitability per fishing unit by type and size of vessels, 1995.
Type of fishing gear
(Baht·month-1)
Gross revenue Cash flow Net income Operating profit Net profit
Otter trawls
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Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 1995.
Note:  1. Cash flow     (Gross revenue) - (Cash cost)
  2. Net income    (Cash flow) - (Depreciation cost)
  3. Operating profit  (Gross revenue) - (Variable cost): or
    (Cash flow) - (Opp. cost of family labor) + (Interest on debt)
  4. Net profit    (Gross revenue) - (Total cost)610 WorldFish Center 611
The results in Table 24 indicate that operators of all 
types  and  sizes  of  fishing  vessels  can  continue 
working. Large pair trawlers (18 - 25 m) yield the 
highest  operating  profit  at  145  108  Baht  (US$ 
3 509)·month-1 while small beam trawlers (< 14 m) 
receive the lowest operating profit, at 8 690 Baht 
(US$210)·month-1. This is due to the fact that large 
trawlers  can  fish  in  distant  fishing  grounds  that 
sometimes  include  the  waters  of  neighbouring 
countries, while the small trawlers can only fish 
along the coast. Large purse seine boats (18 - 25 m) 
yield the highest operating profit of 156 156 Baht 
(US$3  776)·month-1  while  smaller  boats  of  this 
type (< 14 m) yield 38 448 Baht (US$ 930) opera-
ting profit·month-1.
Net Profit
Net profit is the difference between gross revenue 
and total costs. Fishers should not continue opera-
tions if net profit is not higher than depreciation 
cost plus interest on debt and opportunity cost of 
capital.  This  study  showed  that  almost  all  types 
and sizes of operation could maintain their work 
(Table 24). However, many types of fishing gear 
continue  to  operate  owing  to  the  fact  that  any 
adverse  effect  is  lower  than  opportunity  cost  of 
capital plus interest on debt. These are small otter 
trawlers,  small  pair  trawlers,  small  purse  seiners 
and all sizes of push net and gillnet boats, on which 
this return is higher than taking other work.  Large 
otter trawlers (18 - 25 m) return the highest net 
profit in demersal fishing at 62 638 Baht (US$1 515) 
·month-1  while  for  pelagic  fisheries,  large  purse 
seiners (18 - 25 m) yield  the highest net profit at 
87 858 Baht (US$2 125)·month-1, with the mack-
erel gillnetters yielding the lowest at 10 094 Baht 
(US$244)·month-1. On average, all types and sizes 
of purse seine and gillnet boats yield higher net 
profits than any other type of fishing gear.
Factor Return 
 Return on Capital
Return  on  capital  indicates  feasibility  of  fishery 
investment. Since fishing is one of the highest natu-
ral  risk  operations,  its  return  is  high  for  certain 
types of fishing gear. This study examines return on 
initial investment. Return is defined as percentage 
of net profit and opportunity cost of capital on ini-
tial investment. Return on capital for trawlers and 
push netters is higher than for purse seiners and 
gillnetters. Return on capital for small beam trawl-
ers is the highest at 104% owing to the lower in-
vestment requirements than for other types of gear 
of similar size (Table 25). Purse seiners that yield 
highest returns on capital are medium purse sein-
ers (14 - 18 m) and large purse seiners (18 - 25 m) 
at 30%. Large gillnetters (18 - 25 m) yield the high-
est return on capital at 18%.
Returns to Labor
Return to labor is the compensation per working 
day  of  operation.  When  comparing  the  return
against  the  national  minimum  wage  (145  Baht 
(US$5.82 at 1 US$ = 24.92 in 1995, source: oanda. 
com) per day in 1995), the return in the fisheries 
sector is higher on the whole (Table 25). This value 
includes food  which hired crew receive in addition 
to wages and share.  
Table  25.  Return  to  labor  and  capital  by  type  and  size  of  vessels, 
1995.
Type of fishing gear Return to 
capital (%)1/
Return to labor 
(B/person-day)
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Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 1995.
Note:  1/ Return to initial investment = (net profit per year + 
           opportunity cost of capital per year) * 100/ (initial investment)612 WorldFish Center 613
Discarding and by-catch
The percentage of marine fish utilization during the 
past 30 years indicates that the availability of fish 
for human consumption has declined significantly. 
The main reason is the substantial increase in the 
amount of trash fish that is mostly channeled into 
the fishmeal industry. This is not justifiable when 
the per capita fish consumption is declining due to 
increase in population and in export requirements, 
while malnutrition is a serious problem in the rural 
areas. The main cause of malnutrition is poverty 
and  inequality  of  food  distribution.  The  marine 
fisheries sector that provides protein food should 
help in alleviating this problem. 
In response to the misuse of the fish resources, the 
Department of Fisheries has created a program for 
converting trash fish and small pelagic fish, now 
used for fishmeal, into food for direct human con-
sumption. This can be done through employing 
appropriate techniques in handling at sea and dur-
ing  transport,  These  fish  can  be  processed  into   
edible products. This will improve income for those 
who harvest by-catch fish and increase value-added 
in the fisheries sector.
Improved utilization may not satisfy the fishmeal 
industrialist who will be a competitor in buying 
trash fish at higher prices. The higher cost may be-
come  a  barrier  to  exporting  fishmeal.  Fishmeal 
might not be distributed to the domestic animal 
feed  industry;  this  industry  would  then  import 
fishmeal or substitute fishmeal with other feeds. If 
the cost of fishmeal is partially passed to the animal 
feed industry, the burden will fall heavily on con-
sumers. However, this  may not be serious as long 
as consumers have other choices of protein food.
Analysis  of  Market  Structure  and  Price 
of Fish
Marine Fish Marketing in Thailand
Setting Up the Fish Market
The  government  institution  that  deals  with  fish 
marketing in Thailand is the Fish Marketing Orga-
nization  (FMO).  The  functions  of  the  FMO  are: 
(1) to provide fishers with a place for distribution 
of their produce, (2) to manage and control the   
agents who sell the fish, (3) to collect fees and ser-
vice charges from people who use the facilities of 
the market, and (4) to assist, promote development 
and provide welfare for fishers and their villages, 
as well as their cooperatives or organizations.
Operation of the FMO
At present, the FMO operates three wholesale mar-
kets in Bangkok, Samut Sakorn south of Bangkok 
and Samut Prakran east of Bangkok. The FMO also 
operates eleven fishing ports along the coast (two 
in the east, nine in the south, of which six are along 
the Gulf coast and two along the Andaman coast).    
The  FMO  acts  as  the  owner  of  the  market  and 
people  involved  in  the  market  must  obey  their 
rules and regulations. For example, fish agents can-
not charge fishers more than 6% of the total value 
of sales, and 1% must go to the FMO. Other service 
charges that the FMO receives include renting space, 
parking lots, containers etc. The role of the FMO is 
not only providing a market place but also stimu-
lating production.
Market Structure and Marketing Channels 
Traders in the marine catch are fishers themselves, 
fish agent collectors, wholesalers and retailers. Fishers 
may  contemporaneously  conduct  fishing,  selling 
and processing. Some large scale fishers are also 
marine product traders and fish agents. Fish agents 
may be registered with the FMO, or non-registered 
and conduct their business in private or at munici-
pal landing ports. Fish agents may receive fish from 
fishers and trade by means of auction as well as 
negotiation. In remote areas, there are fish collec-
tors who buy from fishers and/or fish agents and 
sell to wholesalers who run large wholesale mar-
kets in big cities and sell to the retailers. The trad-
ing method employed at the FMO fish market and 
landing ports is mainly auction. At landings the   
non-registered fish agents bargain for fish.
Generally, fishers who land  catch at private fishing 
ports have contracts with the agents who usually 
own the port. Thus, the agents influence the price, 
rather than the fishers. Small scale fishers, however, 
also usually perform as fish agents and  have other 
market outlets. In addition, there are many places 
where fishers can land their catch, and even fishers 
with contracts can land their catches somewhere 
else. The degree of monopoly is thus not too strong 
at this stage.
Fish  marketing  facilities  are  inadequate,  which   
makes  possible  the  non-competitive  trade.  The 
central wholesale markets are limited to areas close 612 WorldFish Center 613
to Bangkok (e.g. Samut Sakorn for fish and cuttle-
fish, Samut Prakran for shellfish, and Rayong for 
squid). The Bangkok wholesale fish market seems 
to have reached its maximum capacity. Landing 
points are numerous and scattered. More marketing 
facilities are required such as markets with auc-
tions, ice plants, cold storage facilities and refriger-
ated truck transportation. Improvement in quality 
control  to  minimize  loss  in  trading  should  be 
implemented. 
Fish Price Determination
Price Determination in Fisheries Products
In theory “price determination” deals with the price 
theory and the manner in which economic forces 
influence price under the various market structures 
and the length of run, while “price discovery” is 
used to express the process of struggling between 
buyers and sellers to arrive at a price.  There are 
five pricing system methods: (a) individual negoti-
ation, (b) trading on organized exchange or auc-
tions, (c) formula pricing, (d) group bargaining, 
and (e) administrative decisions, including those 
made in both the private and public sectors.
The  criteria  for  choosing  a  method  are  that  it 
should  not  create  excess  supply,  it  should  have 
some social welfare aspects, i.e. that price is an 
incentive to the fishers for further fishing, provide 
quick  and  reliable  information  and  provide  a 
mechanism at low cost for price setting.
Methods of Setting Price of Fish
The bidding among buyers for fisheries products 
is the most appropriate one. Since fish are difficult 
to standardize and have a wide range of quality 
(size and freshness), physical inspection for each 
lot must be observed by buyers. If there are many 
buyers and the manipulation of price is difficult or 
impossible, the bidding price is a competitive price.   
There should be more than one method of pricing 
fish among the fish agents and fish buyers in a fish 
market. A study of the system for fresh cephalopods 
in  Thailand  (Tokrisna  et  al.  1985)  showed  that 
cephalopod  traders  had  four  buying  methods 
namely,  consignment,  auction,  bargaining  and 
price setting. However, trading at the levels of fish 
agents and collectors, the setting of sale prices was 
classified  into  three  types,  by  buyers,  by  sellers 
and bidding among buyers. At the wholesaler and 
retailer  levels,  sellers  set  the  prices.  Setting  fish 
prices at each level of trade should be more or less 
similar to that for squid.
Factors Affecting Fish Price Setting 
Tokrisna et al. (1985) described the factors affecting 
the  sales  price  of  fresh  cephalopods  as  follows: 
(a) buying price, which means the cost of products, 
(b) quality of the products (size and freshness) so 
that prices can be set by sellers, (c) market situa-
tion, which means the demand for and supply of 
products in the market at that time and (d) prices 
of processed products, especially the export price 
which the exporters use as the basis of estimating 
the purchasing price of raw material.
Tokrisna et al. (1985) found that the fishers knew 
not only the amount and species of fishes in their 
boats  before  approaching  the  port  but  also  had   
price information at all the major ports. Therefore, 
searching for a marketing place had already been 
done. Selecting the species of fish is also dominant 
in each fish market or fishing port.
Summary and Implications for Fisheries 
Management 
Summary
Small Scale Fisheries 
 
The exceptionally high return on some groups of 
fishing gear is because of the monopolistic power 
of these fishing technologies in the coastal areas. 
The high returns are a reflection of the fishing skills 
and  entrepreneurial  ability  of  their  operators  as 
well as of the abundance of fisheries resources in 
coastal areas. Thus, this return consists partly of 
rents of ability and quasi-rents and partly of resource 
rents. This is also reflected in the higher wages. 
From the economic point of view, it appears that 
there is reason for maintaining those gear groups 
and  their  contribution  to  employment  and  fish 
production. 
 
Thus, the most important determinant of profits 
appears to be interaction between type of gear and 
fishing ground. Having the right type of gear at the 
right  fishing  ground  with  appropriate  skill  and 
entrepreneurial spirit appears to be the recipe for 
high profits. The small scale fishers living in the 
coastal  areas  are  in  the  worst  possible  situation 
because of the paucity of funds, of fish resources 
and of non-fishing alternatives. 614 WorldFish Center 615
Commercial Fisheries   
The analysis of investment, cost, revenue and returns 
on demersal and pelagic fishing operations can be 
summarized as follows: (1) the returns differ mark-
edly by size of fishing boat and type of fishing gear; 
(2) the ability to generate profit is greater in large 
fishing boats than small boats due to their greater 
ability to adjust to both economic (investment) and 
biological (fishing ground) changes; and (3) among 
all trawlers, medium and large size boats can best 
adjust and maintain continuous profits while for 
push  nets,  all  sizes  of  boats  have  declining  net 
profits.  As  for  pelagic  fishing  operations,  purse 
seiners have been developed to make high profit 
and still yield a higher return than trawlers and 
gillnet  fishing  operations.  Finally,  the  return  to 
labor, or daily wage, on average is higher than the 
national minimum wage rate.
Due to the open-access fisheries resources, it can 
be forecast that: (1) without restrictions on involve-
ment in the fisheries sector, profits will  encourage 
new fishers into the system; and (2) new entrants 
under static marine resources and price conditions 
will result in a declining trend in profit over the 
long-run.  This  decline  will  restrict  employment 
and investment since revenue will not exceed op-
portunity loss. Will the rapid growth of the fishing 
industry reduce profit? Will this profit slowly de-
cline with expansion of fishing effort? These ques-
tions could not be clearly answered due to insuffi-
cient data to indicate fisheries status; and results 
obtained from studies during previous years are ap-
plicable to the situation only under constant eco-
nomic and biological conditions. Changes in these 
conditions may conceal a decline of profit, so that 
profit is ostensibly increasing (real profit may even 
decline), leading to the entry of new fishers.
Implications for Fisheries Management
The present level of exploitation of demersal fisheries 
resources in inshore waters of the Gulf of Thailand 
up  to  50  m  depth  is  higher  than  the  estimated 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for this area. It is 
clear that this over-fishing is brought about by in-
tensive trawl operations in the area and that it is the 
root cause of the current difficult fisheries situa-
tion. The current situation is clearly reflected in the 
index of abundance or catch per unit effort, which 
has measurably decreased in recent times. At the 
same time, the amount of trash fish in the demer-
sal catches has increased significantly. Immediate 
action is therefore needed to tackle these problems, 
and to conserve the resources through such mea-
sures as reduced fishing effort, and by further pro-
moting  cooperation  between  fishers  and  the 
Department  of  Fisheries.  Fisheries  management 
practices to conserve marine resources in Thai waters 
also need further improvement and existing fisher-
ies regulations need to be more strictly enforced.   
The measures of fisheries management undertaken 
by the Government of Thailand so far are: (i) to 
control and limit entry into fisheries; (ii) the “Com-
mand program” (see The Command Program for 
fisheries  management)  for  fisheries  management; 
and (iii) adopt a community-based fisheries man-
agement regime.
Control and Limited Entry Into Fisheries
The marine capture fisheries of Thailand presently 
face many problems arising from the enforcement 
of EEZs, resulting in a realignment of fishing grounds 
and a decrease in available marine resources. In ad-
dition, the excessive fishing effort and the types of 
fishing gear used by trawlers often cause conflicts 
with the local fishers because of encroachment into 
their traditional fishing grounds, and the destruc-
tion and interference caused to the small scale and 
fixed fishing gear.  
In 1978, the Thai Cabinet adopted a resolution to 
control  and  reduce  the  number  of  trawlers  and 
push nets. The Cabinet Resolution and the subse-
quently adopted Fisheries Act of Thailand have had 
considerable influence in bringing about improve-
ments in the fisheries management practices and 
rationalization of fishing effort in Thailand.  Several 
specific rules and regulations to limit entry into 
both demersal and pelagic fisheries have since been 
declared with different objectives and results, both 
positive and negative.
Operation of  fishing gear in Thai waters requires 
a  license  from  the  Department  of  Fisheries  and 
a navigation certificate from the Harbour Depart-
ment. The license was originally issued automati-
cally on a routine basis on payment of nominal fee, 
and only some small scale fishing gear and certain 
types of small fishing boat were exempted. Issu-
ance  of  fishing  licenses  has  since  been  made 
subject to closer scrutiny on a case-to-case basis.
The basic objective of a ministry regulation issued 
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of  trawlers  and  push  netters  and  thereby  bring 
down demersal catches to the optimum sustainable 
level.  This entailed cutting down the total number 
of trawlers operating from 6 576 units to 3 200 
units in the Gulf of Thailand and 300 units along 
the Andaman Sea coastline. Push nets were to be 
gradually phased out as they invariably operate in 
shallow waters and catch very small fish.
The license regulations of the Ministry were based 
on the following strategies:
1. The number of trawlers and push netters to be
   regulated by controlling the entry of new boats
   into these fisheries as follows:
  -  new fishing licenses not to be issued for any
    type of trawler or push netter;
  -  a fishing license for other types of fisheries
    should not be transferred or utilized to operate 
    trawlers and push netters; 
  -   only the licenses and navigation certificates 
    of  the  holders  of  the  license/certificate  for
     the  preceding  year  to  be  renewed;  transfer
     of these licenses to another person not to be 
    allowed or negotiated under any circumstances,
    except as instances of family inheritance.   
2. The number of currently operating trawlers and 
  push netters to be reduced by various measures 
  as follows:
  -   transfer  of  licenses  issued  for  trawling  and
     push net fisheries to other types of fishing to
     be encouraged;
  -   diversification  and  alternative  utilization  of 
    vessels  used  in  fisheries  for  tourism,  cargo 
    transport, passenger transport, etc. to be pro-
    moted; 
  -   licenses of vessels which become involved in
     trespassing and encroachment into the juris-
    dictional  waters  of  other  countries  to  be 
    forfeited and not reissued.
In 1982, the above regulations were implemented.   
Their effectiveness became evident during the 1981 
- 1988 period, as the number of registered trawlers 
and  push  netters  gradually  decreased.  However, 
the total number of registered trawlers and push 
netters  then  again  increased  to  accommodate 
demands for expansion of fisheries into the EEZs of 
other countries through bilateral agreements.
The Command Program for Fisheries Management
Under the 1947 Fisheries Act, a series of ministerial 
rules and regulations concerning the conservation 
of marine resources was issued in six groups:     
1. Prohibition of the use of certain types of fishing
   gear during the spawning and breeding seasons 
  of some commercially important species.
2. Prohibition of certain types of fishing gear in
   some areas.
3. Protected  areas  are  those  adjacent  to  temples
   and monasteries or any other area designated
  as such by the governors of provinces. All such
   areas are considered as fish sanctuaries where
   fishing of any sort is not permitted.
4. Prohibition of catching endangered and threa-
  tened species.
5. Ban on the use of poisons and stupefying chemi-
  cals, explosives and electric stunning.
6. Prohibition/restrictions on certain types and sizes
  of fishing gear.  
The enforcement of the above regulations has not 
been very effective to date, since they apply to a 
very extensive area spread over the entire coastline 
of Thailand. The number of officials in the field to 
inspect and enforce the regulations is too few. The 
laws of the country require that the fishers need to 
be  caught  in  the  actual  act  of  illegal  fishing  or 
violating the regulations for the law to be upheld in   
court. 
It can thus be concluded that more effective man-
agement of marine resources on a long-term basis 
requires  implementation  and  enforcement  of  all 
current regulations in the field. In particular, there 
is a need for more officials in the field, better infra-
structure facilities to accomplish effective enforce-
ment,  and  delegation  of  sufficient  enforcement 
authority rather than only to the provincial fisheries 
officers.
Community-based Fisheries Management Regime 
The existing control measures have limited success 
for the following reasons: (a) the number of enforce-
ment  staff  and  patrol  boats  is  limited  compared 
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number of fishing boats operating the various types 
of fishing gear, (b) lack of cooperation from fishers, 
(c) high enforcement costs and (d) lack of coordi-
nation among relevant agencies.  
Community-based fisheries management, as initi-
ated by the government, has been implemented in 
coastal  areas,  particularly  in  the  Phang-Nga  Bay 
(Andaman Sea) and Bang Sapan Bay (Gulf of Thai-
land). These projects aimed to change the percep-
tions and attitudes of fisherfolk from that of a user 
to a manager. Activities on grouping, training, social 
development programs, and fish landing-site man-
agement  which  unite  fisherfolk,  and  awareness-
building  and  participation  in  resource  conserva-
tion, have been implemented in the target villages. 
Regular  meetings  among  working  committees  of 
each village have been organized to monitor the 
progress and problems of implementation in each 
village. Visits to the target villages have been regu-
larly carried out. When the fisherfolk learn how 
to manage and conserve the fisheries resources for 
sustainable  utilization,  the  provision  of  fishing 
grounds in their village or group of villages as part 
of village property and as a source of their liveli-
hood will be extended to them. 
Bioeconomic Modeling
Rationale
Thai marine fisheries have experienced rapid growth 
during  the  last  30  years.  Endowed  with  a  large 
Exclusive  Economic  Zone  (EEZ)  and  productive 
marine resources, Thailand has been one of the top 
ten fishing nations of the world since 1972. How-
ever, fisheries development has created  huge pres-
sure on the resources, especially for the demersal 
species in the Gulf of Thailand. The demersal fish-
eries are declining due to over-fishing by trawling 
at a depth of more than 50 m. Catch per unit effort   
(CPUE) by trawlers has steadily declined while the 
number of trawlers of all sizes and types has con-
tinued to increase. Fishers began to use a small 
cod-end mesh size so that more trash fish could be 
caught to compensate for  declining  production. In 
addition, many trawlers which used to fish in for-
eign fishing grounds returned to the Gulf of Thai-
land after the declaration of EEZs in the neighbour-
ing countries. Increases of fuel prices from time 
to time, a part of total costs, forced the fishers to 
reduce unit cost by increasing fishing effort while 
the catch of trash fish increased to 60 - 70% of total 
catch.  All of these factors contributed to the deple-
tion of valuable marine species and decline of fish-
ery resources. The CPUE steadily decreased from 
231.6 kg per standard fishing hour (kg·sfh-1) in 
1963 to 47.3 kg·sfh-1 in 1977 (Jetanavanich, 1981) 
and to 15.85 kg·sfh-1 in 1995. New investment is 
still taking place to increase fishing effort in order 
to  maintain  or  increase  the  production  volume. 
Overall, current fishing effort in the Gulf of Thai-
land has expanded far beyond the biological and 
economic maximum yields.
Despite the number of studies on demersal fisheries, 
few have been done on the economics of fisheries 
in the Gulf of Thailand. Of these, the most notable 
was  the  study  by  (Panayotou  and  Jetanavanich, 
1987), which made the first attempt to determine 
the levels of catch and fishing effort that give rise to 
the static MEY. They found that the optimum catch 
and effort (given a mesh size 2.5 cm) for demersal 
fisheries were 958 000 t and 15.7 million standard 
fishing  hour  respectively.  More  importantly,  the 
results implied that the demersal catch had sur-
passed the level of static MEY. 
The  past  and  current  conservation  measures  are 
based purely on biological data, but the integration 
of economics and biological factors in determining 
the  optimal  utilization  of  demersal  resources  is 
necessary  to  manage  these  fish  stocks.  For  this 
purpose, a multi-disciplinary approach is needed. 
A detailed analysis of demersal fishing in the Gulf 
of Thailand that includes both fisheries population 
dynamics and economic considerations would be 
highly valued.  
This study focuses on the bioeconomic modeling of 
demersal fisheries in the Gulf of Thailand with the 
objective of providing the basis for more effective 
management of the demersal resources in the area. 
The study employs a dynamic approach to arrive at 
the optimal level of demersal stock, yield and fish-
ing effort. Also, recommendations for demersal fish-
eries management are provided.
Review of Fisheries Legal Environment 
The Fisheries Act of 1947 empowers the responsible 
Minister with the authority to introduce a licensing 
system and fishing regulations such as closed areas 
and seasons, mesh size limitations, gear restrictions 
and catch quotas, and with the authority to enforce 
these measures. In practice, however, the Minister 
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licensing  system  and  other  fisheries  regulations 
because  of  both  administration  constraints  and 
political considerations. As in many other countries, 
the  budget,  manpower  and  the  authority  of  the 
Department of Fisheries (DOF) are clearly inade-
quate for operating and enforcing a licensing sys-
tem and other fisheries regulations. Moreover, po-
litical considerations militate against a substantial 
reduction of effort and against restrictions on its 
expansion.
Even the licensing scheme, which freezes the num-
ber of trawlers and prohibits their transfer and the 
construction of new vessels, may be inadequate. 
First, as the fishing vessels are to be registered with 
the Harbour Department while the gear is licensed 
by the DOF, a loophole exists which enables regis-
tered fishing vessels to operate without a license 
for gear. Second, with the current budget and man-
power it is not easy for the DOF to enforce the 
licensing system over an extensive and technologi-
cally advanced fleet which can operate from foreign 
ports. Third, even if the system could be enforced, 
it can  block new entrants and may reduce fishing 
effort by normal attrition, but it will take a very 
long time to cut effort to about half its current level, 
as required. Last, even if effort could be reduced to 
its optimum level, without an effective mechanism 
of creaming off resource rents, the newly estab-
lished rents (as a result of the reduction in effort) 
would create such a potent incentive to increase 
effort that rents would again be dissipated through 
either excess effort or higher enforcement costs.
Similarly, other regulations such as the prohibition 
of push netting and trawling within 3 km from the 
shore and the recommendation for a 4 cm mesh 
size are generally ignored, as evidenced by the large 
numbers of push netters and trawlers in the pro-
hibited zone, and the use of 2.5 cm mesh size. A 
two-month seasonal closure of the central western 
Gulf was not well accepted.
Input policies, such as subsidized credit and tax 
exemptions for fishing machinery and equipment, 
are intended to relieve short-term hardships. How-
ever, these policies are certain to deepen capital in-
tensity at the expense of labor employment, to en-
courage new entry to the resources and to widen 
the dualism between small- and large scale fishers. 
Moreover, new entries will nullify any temporary 
gains to the fishers, necessitating new subsidies in 
the future which, having created a precedent, will 
be difficult to resist. 
Output policies such as price supports, while in-
tended to raise fishers’ incomes and to ensure in-
creased fish supplies for human consumption at 
low prices, are self-defeating in the long run under 
open-access. To the extent that they are effective in 
raising fishing incomes, new entrants are attracted 
into the fishery, and, as a result, the resource base 
deteriorates, incomes fall, and new supports are 
required.
Intervention in international trade, such as promo-
tion  of  exports  and  tariffs  on  fish  imports  may 
temporarily succeed in raising fishing incomes, in 
improving the balance of payments and in protect-
ing the local industry, but no lasting benefit can be 
expected  under  the  present  open-access  status 
and the depleted state of the resource. At present, 
increased fishery exports can be had only through 
destructive or ‘piratical’ fishing.
Effort  is  also  being  made  to  conserve  fishery 
resources  by  encouraging  distant-water  fishing, 
especially through joint fishing ventures and other 
fishery  agreements  with  neighbouring  countries 
(e.g.  with  Bangladesh,  Malaysia,  Myanmar  and 
Indonesia). Although some additional fish supplies 
have been forthcoming as a result of these ven-
tures, there is no evidence that over-fishing in Thai 
waters  and  encroachment  on  foreign  resources 
have diminished. To the extent that joint ventures 
are  successful,  they  tend  to  encourage  the  con-
struction  of  new,  larger  vessels  rather  than  the 
utilization of existing ones.
Framework and Estimation
Model Specification 
Size of fishing effort is a major determining factor 
in  the  production  from  and  sustainability  of  a 
developed fishery. Hence, for optimal resource use 
(Panayotou  and  Jetanavanich,  1987),  it  is  often 
recommended that fishing effort be controlled to 
prevent  over-fishing  or  dissipation  of  economic 
rents.  From  the  economic  point  of  view,  the 
optimal level of effort is the level at which eco-
nomic  rents  are  maximized.  This  level  of  effort 
generates the MEY which is the return on the scarc-
est factor of production, the fish stock. Of course, 
a managing authority may define as optimum yield 
that  which  maximizes  other  benefits  such  as 
“employment, equity or stability”, but here we will 
assume  that  the  objective  is  to  maximize  the 
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MEY  is  determined  by  maximizing  the  spread 
between total fishing revenues and costs, which is 
accomplished  by  equating  the  marginal  revenue 
(MR) of effort to the marginal cost (MC) of effort.   
This requires estimation of revenue and cost func-
tions. Assuming constant cost per unit of effort (c), 
the cost function (TC) presents no difficulty. The 
total marginal and average costs may be written 
respectively as:
  TC  = cf  (1)
  MC  = AC = c  (2)
where  f  denotes  fishing  effort  and  AC  denotes 
average costs.
However, estimation of the revenue function in-
volves  estimation  of  the  underlying  sustainable 
yield function, which is a relationship between sus-
tainable catch (Y) and effort (f). In the case of single 
species fisheries or when species are aggregated, a 
sustainable function can be estimated by fitting a 
logistic growth curve to catch and effort data; the 
Schaefer (Schaefer 1954) and Fox (Fox 1970) Mod-
els can be used.   
The Schaefer Model, a linear model  is specified as:
  Y/f = a + bf  (3)
  where a and b are estimated  parameters
The Schaefer model, a parabola, has its MSY at an 
effort level of:
 
  fMSY = -0.5 a/b  (4)
  with the corresponding sustainable yield:
  MSY =  -0.25 a2/b   (5)
The Fox Model gives a straight line when the loga-
rithms of Y/f are plotted on effort:
  Ln (Y/f) = c + df  (6)
The Fox Model can be rewritten as:
  Y/f = e c + df  (7)
 
  where c and d are constant parameters.
The  level  of  effort  generating  the  MSY  can  be 
obtained from (7) through differentiation as:
  fMSY  =  -1/ d  (8)
 
MSY itself is obtained by combining equations (7) 
and (8) to give:
  MSY = (-1/ d)ec-1  (9)
Then the total (TR), marginal (MR) and average 
(AR) revenue functions for the Schaefer Model may 
be written respectively as:
  TR = p (af + bf2)  (10)
  MR = p (a + 2bf)  (11)
  and
 
  AR =  p (a + bf).  (12)
The total, marginal and average revenue functions 
for Fox Model may be written respectively as:
  TR = p (fi e (c + df) )  (13)
  MR = pG (f(d)e(df) + e(df))  (14)
  AR = p (e (c + df) )  (15)
  where, TR = total revenue
                p = fish price. 
G = estimated constant; parameter of the sustain-
able yield function
   
The optimum or MEY level of effort is obtained by 
equating the MR and MC of effort, i.e.
Schaefer Model may be written, as:
  p (a + 2bf) = c
   
  fMEY = (c-pa) / 2bp  (16)
Fox Model may be written, as:
  pG [dfedf + edf] = c,  or
  dfedf + edf = c/pG   (17)
Under  open-access,  fishers  attempt  to  maximize 
their profits but because of lack of exclusive prop-618 WorldFish Center 619
erty rights over the resource, they have no incentive 
to take into account the effect of their fishing effort 
on  other  fishers’  catch.  The  guiding  variable  for 
expansion of effort is the expected average revenue 
of effort rather than the marginal revenue. That is, 
under open-access the profit-maximizing rule for 
the individual fishers (but not society as a whole) is 
to expand effort as long as the average revenue (AR) 
of effort exceeds the average cost (AC) of effort, no 
matter what this might do to other fishers’ revenues 
and to future revenues. Thus, under open-access 
the effort for the fisheries as a whole expands to 
point where AR = AC, or
For  the Schaefer Model 
  fOA = (c-pa) / bp  (18)
for the Fox Model 
  pe (c + df) = c, or  (19)
  e (c + df) = c / p  (20)
By taking the natural logarithm ln to both sides we   
obtain (12) as:
  ln e (c + df) =  ln c/p, or
  c + df = ln (c/p), or
  fOA = [ln (c/p) - c]/d  (21)
Thus  at  the  fOA  level  of  effort  profits  are  totally 
dissipated:
  TROA - TCOA = 0  (22)
At the fOA level of effort, neither do the fishers earn   
profit nor does the society earn economic rents for 
its scare fishery resource. All potential surplus of 
revenues over costs has been totally dissipated in 
excessive  effort  under  open-access.  Reduction  of 
effort from fOA down to fMEY would generate sub-
stantial profits to remaining fishers (or rents to the 
society), and at the same time increase the size of 
the fish stock, even  if at fOA the stock is severely 
depleted.
Data: Catch, effort, fishing costs and fish price
Catch
The data for dermersal fish and trash fish catches in 
the Gulf of Thailand for the 1971 - 95 period  were 
collected from the Fisheries Statistics Base on the 
Sample Survey (various issues), officially reported by 
the Fisheries Economics Division of DOF. For this 
study, demersal harvests were divided into demer-
sal fish (17 species) and trash fish. Species of de-
mersal fish included barracuda, croaker, threadfin 
bream, monocle bream, lizardfish, hairtail, snapper, 
sweetlip, bigeye, sand whiting, barbell eel, marine 
catfish, rays, sharks, flatfishes, Indian halibut and 
conger eel. Inconsistencies in the way in which the 
data were reported were evident, and they were 
therefore adjusted to attain greater accuracy. 
For the period 1971 - 84, the data reported the 
catch of the demersal fish and trash fish from Thai 
waters, but were broken down by gear type and 
vessel size. The proportion of demersal fish and 
trash fish from the Gulf of Thailand  was estimated 
from the 1985 - 95 Marine Fisheries Statistics Base 
on the Sample Survey. 
The 1985 - 95  report showed the catch of demersal 
fish and trash fish from the Gulf of Thailand and 
Andaman Sea broken down by gear type and vessel 
size. 
Fishing effort
To match demersal catches with their corresponding 
levels of fishing effort, data were collected in the 
Gulf of Thailand for vessel-fishing-hours. During 
1971 - 95, fishing effort was obtained from the Ma-
rine Fisheries Statistics Base on the Sample Survey. 
Since  demersal  resources  are  caught  by  various 
types of gear and size of vessels, it was necessary to 
translate fishing effort into equivalent, or standard-
ized units. For commercial fishing, gear is shown in 
Appendix Table 1, namely: otter board trawl, pair 
trawl, beam trawl, push net, purse seine, anchovy 
purse seine, mackerel encircling gillnet, king mack-
erel gillnet, and nominal fishing hours. Since en-
gine horsepower (HP) is different for different sizes 
of vessels and types of gear, nominal fishing hours 
were standardized by using the 14 - 18 m otter 
board trawl as the standard, and an index of vessel 
HP is shown in Appendix Table 2. Standard effort 
was calculated by multiplying the HP index of each 
gear by nominal fishing hours for that gear, and is 
shown in Appendix Table 3. For small scale fisher-
ies and bamboo stake traps, data on fishing hours 
were unavailable. Standard effort was calculated by 
dividing catch by the catch per hour of a 14 - 18 m 
otter board trawl vessel. The total standard effort is 
the sum of the standard effort of all the gear-types, 
and is shown in Appendix Table 3. Since effort is 620 WorldFish Center 621
affected  over  time  through  gear  improvement,  a   
technological  adjustment  factor  is  calculated  by 
dividing catch per hour of the standard vessel by 
catch per hour of a research vessel (Ahmed 1991). 
The catching power of the research vessel remained 
unchanged over time, allowing it to serve as a tech-
nological standard. CPUE of the research vessel is 
shown in Appendix Table 4. In 1990, 1992 and 
1994, no experimental survey was conducted. For 
these years the mean CPUE of the preceding and 
the following year was used as an estimate of CPUE. 
The adjusted effort was calculated by multiplying 
standard effort by a technological adjustment factor.
Fishing Cost
The unit cost is represented by cost per standard 
unit of fishing effort. The total cost of fishing for 
demersal fish and trash fish was calculated from   
the  Cost  and  Earnings  Survey  of  Major  Fishing 
Gear in 1995 (Department of Fisheries (DOF) 1972 
- 97). The major fishing gear was otter board trawl, 
pair trawl and push net. By using the annual cost of 
major fishing gear per vessel, the major cost of each 
fleet  was  calculated  by  multiplying  the  annual 
major fishing gear cost per vessel by the total num-
ber of vessels in the Gulf of Thailand in 1995 em-
ployed in that fleet. The total fleet cost is the sum of 
the costs of all the gear-types, and it  represents the 
total cost of total catches in the Gulf of Thailand. 
The  proportion  of  demersal  fish  and  trash  fish 
catch value was estimated from Fisheries Statistics 
of  Thailand  in  1995  (Department  of  Fisheries 
(DOF) 1972 - 97). The demersal fish and trash fish 
cost was calculated by multiplying percentage of 
demersal fish and trash fish value by the total cost. 
The demersal fish and trash fish cost of major fish-
ing gear divided by the total standard fishing effort 
of those gears gave CPUE .
Fish Price
Figures on demersal fish and trash fish prices from 
the Gulf of Thailand are available in Fisheries Sta-
tistics of Thailand in 1995. (Department of Fisher-
ies (DOF) 1972 - 97).
Model Estimation and Results
Having described the economics and the state of 
Thai marine fisheries resources, the optimal level of 
resources use can now be determined. The optimal 
resource use was postulated to be  the level of catch 
and effort that maximize the sustainable economic 
yield (MEY) or rent from the fisheries, that is, the 
excess  of  sustainable  revenues  over  costs.  Of 
course, it is always possible to increase current eco-
nomic rents (profits) beyond this level but, in the 
same way that catch above MSY cannot be sus-
tained for long, profits above MEY cannot be sus-
tained. Thus, ignoring adjustment and enforcement 
costs which could be substantial, fisheries manage-
ment should aim at the attainment of the MEY level 
of effort, as it can be shown to be superior to all 
other  levels  of  effort,  including  that  of  MSY  in 
terms of return on a limited resource. The purpose 
of this study is to determine MEY for the Gulf of 
Thailand  and  the  corresponding  levels  of  effort, 
catch,  revenues,  costs  and  profits  and  compare 
them to those prevailing under open-access and 
MSY management. Following our theoretical frame-
work, this estimation is based on an assumption of 
fixed prices.
The State of the Resources - MSY
Both the Schaefer model and the Fox model were 
used to obtain estimates of MSY for a mesh size of 
2.5 cm (commercial fleet), using 1971 - 95 data (see 
Model specification). 
  Y/f = a + bf, 
  Ln (Y/f) = c + df, 
where  Y  is  catch,  and  f  is  standardized  fishing 
effort, and a and b are parameters to be estimated.   
Estimation  was  derived  by  dividing  equation  by 
effort to obtain the CPUE as a function of effort. We 
then  regressed  CPUE  on  standardized  effort  to 
obtain estimates of the parameters a and b. The 
empirical results indicate that the Schaefer model 
and the Fox model fitted the catch and effort data. 
The results are as follows:
Schaefer Model
  Y = 57.134 589 1 - 0.000 000 821f
  R2 =  0.90, F =  222.824 7, df = 24
Fox Model
  Y = fe(4.19 - 0.000 000 026f) 
  R2 = 0.96, F = 618.8, df = 24
where R2 is the coefficient of determination adjusted 620 WorldFish Center 621
for  degrees  of  freedom,  F  is  the  F-ratio,  and  df 
denotes degrees of freedom.   
Based on these estimates, we calculated MSY and 
corresponding level of effort using equations (5), 
(4), (9) and (10) of our theoretical framework. The 
results are as follows:
Schaefer Model 
  fMSY = 34.76 x 106 standard fishing hours (sfh)
  MSY = 993 x 103t
Fox Model
  fMSY =  37.69 x 106 sfh
 
  MSY = 915 x 103 t 
Optimal Resource Use (Fixed Price Model) - MEY
Recall that the level of effort yielding the MEY, fMEY 
of the Schaefer model and the Fox model were given 
in equations (16) and (17) respectively as:
  fMEY = (c-pa) / 2bp,
 
  dfedf  + edf = c / pG,
      
where p is the price of fish per kg, c is the cost per 
unit of standard fishing effort and a, b and G are the 
parameters of the sustainable yield function. The 
1995 value for fish price and cost per unit effort 
were estimated as: price (p) = 6.68 Baht·kg-1 and cost 
(c) = 69.67 Baht·sfh-1 (for a mesh size of 2.5 cm). 
Substituting these values into the equation above 
we obtain the result for Schaefer model as follows:
  fMEY = 28.42 x 106 sfh
  MEY = 960 x 103 t 
Solving  the  equation  for  effort  (fMEY)  of  the  Fox 
model, fMEY = 25.86 x 106 sfh with a mesh size of 
2.5 cm.  The corresponding catch is obtained by 
substituting  the  value  of  fMEY  in  equation  (7)  to 
obtain:
  YMEY  = fMEY .ea + bf MEY
where a and b are the parameters of the function.   
Substituting these values into the equation above 
we obtain: YMEY = 960 x 103 t with a mesh size of 
2.5 cm.
The  results  reported  are  in  Tables  26  -  27  and 
Fig.2 with the corresponding actual 1995 figures, 
and the estimated MSY and open-access figures. 
From Table 26, the MEY level of effort is about 
50% of the actual 1995 level and 82% of the MSY 
level. However, the actual catch is 93% of MEY 
and 90% of MSY catch. Profits are as expected, i.e. 
highest at MEY, amounting to 4 433 million Baht 
(US$178 million at 1 US$ = 24.92 Baht in 1995) 
or 5% higher than at MSY. From Table 27, the 
MEY  level  of  effort  is  about  46%  of  the  actual 
1995 level and 69% of the MSY level. However, the 
actual  catch  is  98%  of  MSY  catch.  Profits  are 
highest at MEY amounting to 3 943 million Baht 
(US$158 million) or 5% higher than at MSY. Ac-
cording to these findings, MEY management would 
earn the industry and the country an additional 
1 904 - 2 394 million Baht (US$48 - 96 million) in 
profits, gross of management costs. If the fishery is 
left unmanaged, it is expected to reach an open-
access (zero profits) level at 56.62 - 69.56 x 106 sfh, 
with a sustainable catch of 593 000 - 725 000 t, 
and society would lose 3 943 - 4 433 million Baht 
(US$158 - 178 million) in resources rents.













MSY 34.76 993 6 634 2 422 4 212
MEY 28.42 960 6 413 1 980 4 433
Open-access 56.84 593 3 960 3 960 0
Actual (1995) 56.62 896 5 983 3 945 2 039
1 Baht = US$0.04 in 1995 (source: oanda.com)622 WorldFish Center 623













MSY 37.69 916 6 116 2 626 3 491
MEY 25.86 860 5 745 1 802 3 943
Open-access 69.56 725 4 846 4 846 0
Actual (1995) 56.62 896 5 983 3 945 2 039
1 Baht = US$0.04 in 1995 (source: oanda.com)





































Fig. 2. Fixed price model applied to demersal fisheries (demersal fish and trash fish) in the Gulf of Thailand.
Discussion
In the light of our findings, the feasibility of stated 
government  objectives  and  the  effectiveness  of 
current policies in achieving these objectives are 
evaluated. Modifications of fishery policy targets in 
the context of the country’s broader development 
objectives as well as alternatives are proposed.
Policy Issues
From the preceding analysis of the Thai fisheries 
three fundamental policy issues emerge: (a) how to 
reduce over-fishing and induce a recovery of Thai-
land’s demersal resources without reducing fishery 
production  and  employment;  (b)  how  best  to 
utilize Thailand’s sizeable distant-water fleet and 
technological  advantage;  (c)  to  reduce  the  en-
croachment into neighbouring countries’ EEZs and 
improve  Thailand’s  international  image.  Taken 
together these three issues amount to a quest for a 
national fisheries policy which would maximize the 
overall benefits from the fishery to the society with 
due concern for their distribution and short-run 
adjustment problems.622 WorldFish Center 623
This is admittedly a difficult task for any country, 
but  especially  for  a  developing  country  such  as 
Thailand, which has little tradition and experience 
in  sustainable  resource  management  and  limited 
enforcement capability. With the notable exception 
of joint fishing ventures, it is difficult to think of 
management  interventions  that  will  not  involve 
curtailment of fisheries production and employment 
and increased conflict, at least in the short run. As 
our models have shown, whether the maximization 
of  physical  or  economic  yield  is  selected  as  the 
objective of management makes little difference by 
comparison to a situation of no management or 
open-access.
As evidenced by the National Fisheries Policy and 
other  official  statements,  the  government  does 
perceive these issues, and attempts are being made 
to tackle them. The question is whether the existing 
legal and policy frameworks are appropriate and 
sufficient to deal with these issues, especially in the 
light of budgetary and administrative constraints 
and the high enforcement costs. To investigate this, 
it is necessary to review the existing legislation and 
policy framework.
In addition to the fisheries legislation and related 
management policies which aim at regulating fishing
effort, the policy framework for Thai fisheries in-
cludes input, output and trade policies which aim 
to raise fishers’ incomes, thereby subsidizing fish-
ing effort. Such policies include financial support at 
subsidized interest rates, fuel price and fish price 
subsidy, tax exemptions for fishing machinery and 
equipment,  provision  of  storage  and  processing 
facilities, price support, export promotion and import 
discouragement. These policies are usually intro-
duced as second-best solutions or stop-gap mea-
sures at a time of a sudden shock or crisis, but 
usually outlive their original purpose.
Towards a National Fisheries Policy
Problems such as those facing the Thai fishing in-
dustry  require  a  comprehensive  fisheries  policy 
in line with broader development objectives. One 
possibility  worth  considering  is  to  empower  the 
Department of Fisheries with the formulation and 
implementation of a national fisheries policy with 
upgraded authority and budget, thus strengthening 
its enforcement capability. 
The first step in such a policy would be an immediate 
and effective freeze in the number of trawlers and 
push netters, in particular through prohibition of 
the construction of new vessels and the compulsory 
registration of existing vessels with the Department 
of Fisheries. The next step would be the issuance of 
fishing licenses to existing vessels based on their 
current level of catching power, unless it is deter-
mined that the current mesh size is smaller than the 
optimum, in which case a larger mesh size should 
be specified. Licenses would need to be made non-
transferable without exemptions and be retracted 
upon the retirement of either the owner or the ves-
sel, whichever comes first, until the fleet is reduced 
to its optimum size. The license fees which are now 
negligible (e.g. 5 Baht (US$0.12 in 1998)·m-1 foot-
rope for trawlers, 2 Baht (US$0.05 in 1998)·m-1 
foot-rope for gillnetters and purse seiners and 150 
Baht (US$3.63 in 1998) per gear for push netters) 
would need to be raised to the estimated market 
value of the license. As effort is reduced (or fish 
prices  rise),  the  license  fees  should  be  revised 
upward to extract the newly created rents and to 
reduce the incentive for expansion of effort. Annual 
adjustments of the allowable effort and license fees 
may be necessary to take account of natural fluctua-
tions in the resources and changes in fishing costs.
The government could speed up the attrition process
by offering to buy back and cancel the licenses of 
fishers who choose to leave the fishery. This could 
be made more attractive by offering to retrain and/
or relocate those who leave the fishery as well as by 
developing alternative employment opportunities. 
It is possible to use the licensing mechanism to 
discourage certain gear, such as trawl, and encourage 
others such as purse seine, if they are judged to 
have a differential impact on the state of the resources.
Finally, every effort  needs to be made to minimize 
enforcement  costs  through  technical  means  and 
self-policing. This is particularly applicable to the 
government’s efforts to improve the Socioeconomic 
position of small scale fishers and to reduce their 
conflicts with large scale fishers. One of the regula-
tions most difficult to enforce has been the prohibi-
tion of trawling and push netting within the 3 km 
from shore strip reserved for small scale fishers. 
These boats not only compete with coastal fishers 
for a limited resource but they destroy the inshore 
nursery  grounds  and  habitat,  by  catching  large 
quantities of juvenile fish and causing damage to 
stationary and other  gear employed by small scale 
fishers. Small scale fishers, unable to compete, often 
resort to equally destructive fishing methods such 
as dynamite, poison and fine mesh nets.624 WorldFish Center 625
The ultimate success of a national fisheries policy 
lies in the correct and timely mix of fisheries man-
agement and non-fisheries development. Under the 
prevailing  conditions  of  rising  landlessness  and 
swelling unemployment in the rest of the economy, 
only broad-based rural development will put an 
end to the continual drift into ‘common-property’ 
resources and major urban centers. In its absence, 
fisheries  regulation  cannot  be  effective.  Unem-
ployed fishers have little choice but to encroach on 
reserved  forests,  mineral  concessions  and  public 
land, or move into urban centers creating a host of 
social and environmental problems.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The management of the demersal fisheries in the 
Gulf of Thailand that began in the 1980s by con-
trolling  the  number  of  trawlers  has  been  based 
purely on biological data. A detailed analysis of the 
fishery that includes both bioeconomic and Socio-
economic  factors  would  be  highly  valuable  in 
determining the optimal utilization of the demersal 
resource (including trash fish). Unfortunately, data 
on  socio-cultural  and  human  factors  are  limited 
and  subjective.  This  study  has  focused  on  bio-
economic modeling of demersal fish and trash fish 
with the objective of providing an effective founda-
tion  for  the  utilization  and  management  of  the 
demersal fisheries in the Gulf of Thailand.
The bioeconomic model based on (Fox 1970) of 
demersal fish treats the stock as a single entity or 
biomass,  and  growth  is  assumed  to  be  density-
dependent. The result indicates that demersal fish 
are  economically  over-fished.  The  fishery  could 
earn additional rents by curtailing both excessive 
fishing effort and catch. For a start at controlling 
the  demersal  fisheries,  a  license  limitation  and 
mesh size enlargement scheme are recommended.
Optimal resource utilization based solely on achiev-
ing economic efficiency may fail to reflect broader 
social issues. Any controls or constraints on fishers’ 
behaviour that will be acceptable must incorporate 
social, political, and legal concerns. Nevertheless, 
departure from economic efficiency as the objective 
should only be allowed within limits.
In Thailand, the fishing industry is very complex, 
with multi-species, multi-gear fisheries, and different 
scales of fishing operations. Actions directly tar-
geted on one species can be expected to affect all 
other species. This suggests that optimal fishing for 
one species considered alone may mean sub-optimal 
fishing in other fisheries. This makes fisheries man-
agement in Thailand a difficult task. 
However, the Thai fishing industry needs proper 
regulation  and  fishing  effort  should  be  reduced   
through prohibition of construction of new trawl-
ers and a ban on push nets, change from destruc-
tive fishing gear to other methodologies or aquacul-
ture, and purchasing of excess fishing vessels from 
fishers.
Other important fishery policy issues not covered 
by this study include prohibition of fishing by all 
type of fishing gear at all times in  protected areas. 
Coral  reefs,  seagrass  beds  and  mangroves  are 
important habitats and spawning grounds of sev-
eral  marine resources. Additional measures include 
minimization  of  by-catch,  by  improving  fishing 
techniques, controlling mesh size and limiting the 
amount of time spent  fishing. 
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1966 348 683 140.72 2.48
1967 388 333 120.72 3.22
1968 531 762 104.13 5.11
1969 577 621 97.86 5.90
1970 607 225 94.17 6.45
1971 624 067 60.35 10.34
1972 737 939 51.16 14.42
1973 738 136 45.64 16.17
1974 848 424 45.46 18.66
1975 814 828 44.49 18.31
1976 588 622 54.62 10.78
1977 791 839 42.24 18.75
1978 792 230 46.81 16.92
1979 727 212 47.85 15.20
1980 725 864 44.42 16.34
1981 740 180 35.00 21.15
1982 744 191 37.83 19.67
1983 729 040 38.26 19.05
1984 690 458 47.18 14.63
1985 711 691 44.98 15.82
1986 889 600 38.08 23.36
1987 1 029 209 29.69 34.67
1988 920 631 21.76 42.31
1989 903 741 15.59 57.97
1991 774 132 20.40 37.95
1993 869 601 27.45 31.68
1995 899 899 15.82 56.88
Source: Marine Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries 
1946 - 95.626 WorldFish Center 627
Appendix Table 2. Annual costs of trawl and push net fisheries by size of fishing vessel in Gulf of Thailand, 1995.









Otter trawl < 14 1 784 825 380 1 472.48
14 - 18 1 948 1 556 740 3 032.53
18 - 25 1 496 2 275 200 3 403.70
Sub-total 7 908.71
Pair trawl <  14 16 1 947 864 31.17
14 - 18 186 2 702 003 502.57
18 - 25 491 4 608 520 2 262 78
Sub-total 2 796.52
Push Net  < 14 402 614 107 246.87
14 - 18 85 1 173 753 99.77
18 - 25 35 2 306 508 80.73
Sub-total 427.37
Grand Total 11 132 60
Source: Fisheries Economic Division, Department of Fisheries.
                          Appendix Table 3. Computation for catch cost of demersal fisheries per standard efforts.
Amount Cost (Baht x 106) 11 132.60
Percentage of catch value (%) (demersal fish and trash fish) 34.33
Catch cost for demersal fish and trash fish (Baht x 106) 3 821.82
Standard effort (Hr x 106) 54.82
Cost per unit effort (Baht·St Hr-1) 69.72626 WorldFish Center 627











df 1 25 26






Standard Error 0.115928278 5.9531E-07
t Stat 18.38194785 -8.1703033
P-value 4.89686E-16 1.597E-08
Lower 95% 1.892228973 -6.09E-06
Upper 95% 2.369746154 -3.638E-06
Lower 95.0% 1.892228973 -6.09E-06
Upper 95.0% 2.369746154 -3.638E-06628 WorldFish Center